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The aim of this study is to estimate the impact of the removal of NTBs in trade 
between the EU and its selected CIS partners: Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan (CIS5). The report includes a discussion of methodologies of 
measurement of non-tariff barriers and the impact of their removal, including a 
review of previous studies focusing on CEE and CIS regions.  Further, we employ 
a computable general equilibrium model encompassing the following three pillars 
of trade facilitation: legislative and regulatory approximation, reform of customs 
rules and procedures and liberalization of the access of foreign providers of ser-
vices.  We conclude that a reduction of NTBs and improved access to the EU mar-
ket would bring significant benefits to the CIS5 countries in terms of welfare 
gains, GDP growth, increases in real wages and expansion of international trade. 
The possible welfare implications of deep integration with the EU range from 
5.8% of GDP in Ukraine to sizeable expected gains in Armenia (3.1%), Russia 
(2.8%), Azerbaijan (1.8%) and Georgia (1.7%). DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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1. Introduction 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was created with the aim of ex-
tending the area of prosperity, stability and security to the new EU neighbours 
following the EU Enlargement in 2004. The ENP offers deeper political and eco-
nomic integration to countries bordering the EU. The ENP applies to the immedi-
ate neighbours by land or sea: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, 
Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. The EU has developed a Strategic Partner-
ship with Russia covering four “common spaces”. The central elements of the 
ENP are the bilateral Action Plans that set out an agenda for political and eco-
nomic reforms with various short to medium-term priorities. The Action Plans 
contain provisions on gradual harmonization of the national legislation with the 
acquis in selected areas. The Action Plans set a clear agenda for harmonization of 
product standards and provide detailed provisions on customs, state aid and com-
petition policy. The implementation of the ENP Action Plans is to lay grounds for 
the conclusion of deep and comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with 
the ENP partners, covering substantially all trade in goods and services and in-
cluding legally-binding provisions on trade and economic regulatory issues
1. 
The aim of this paper is to estimate the likely impact of the institutional har-
monization through the removal of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in trade with the EU 
in selected countries. We focus on Russia along with four ENP countries: Arme-
nia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine. We refer to them as the CIS5. The country 
coverage was dictated by broader research agenda of the ENEPO
2 project and by 
data availability. We begin with a review of studies on deep integration and on the 
measurement of NTBs in Central and Eastern Europe and in CIS countries in the 
Chapter 2. Then we proceed with an overview of the progress in harmonization of 
product standards and reform of the conformity assessment infrastructure, customs 
and barriers to foreign provision of services in the CIS5 (Chapter 3). Finally, we 
provide our estimates of the likely impact of FTAs between the EU and the CIS5, 
looking at a Simple FTA (tariff reductions) and a Deep FTA (significant reduction 
of NTBs and improvements in the business environment). 
                                                 
1 For a review of the institutional harmonization in the context of the ENP, please see 
Kolesnichenko (2009). 
2 http://enepo.case.com.pl/dyn/?ID=enepo&nlang=710. Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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2. Measuring the Magnitude of 
Non-Tariff Barriers
3  
Further integration of the ENP countries with the EU can affect the economies 
of both the ENP countries and the EU in several ways: via trade, FDI, domestic 
investment etc. These effects work through at least three major channels: first is 
elimination (or at least reduction) of administrative barriers, such as reduced costs 
of passing customs at the frontier; second is mitigation of risks and uncertainties, 
which form substantial impediments to trade, for example, instability of business 
environment; third is the reduction in technical barriers to trade (TBTs). The single 
market reduces TBTs by means of mutual recognition of different technical regu-
lations, minimum safety requirements and harmonization of rules and regulations.  
Earlier studies (e.g. Baldwin et al., 1997; Keuschnigg and Kohler, 2002) admit 
that quantifying the accession to the internal market is not an easy task. The com-
plexity of the Single Market access makes it impossible to model it explicitly in a 
general equilibrium model. The standard solution used by these authors is to 
model Single Market access crudely as a reduction in the real cost of trade. So, the 
authors did not attempt to actually measure NTBs and thus quantify their impact, 
but simply made assumptions on trade cost reductions. Thus, Baldwin et al. (1997) 
assume this to be equivalent to a 10% reduction in real cost of all CEEC-EU trade, 
whereas Keuschnigg and Kohler (2002) argue that a trade cost reduction of 5% is 
appropriate. As Nahuis (2004) notices, these approaches have some obvious limi-
tations. First, any such assumption is arbitrary. Second, the assumed number is 
identical for all countries. Third, it is identical for all industries. Again, Nahuis 
(2004) in his work shows that the impact of the internal market accession is mark-
edly different across industries and countries.  
Taking into account the above mentioned limitations, three alternative methods 
of measuring NTBs have been developed. First, frequency-type measures can be 
constructed using, for example, UNCTAD database (which is commodity/sector 
and country specific) or using special surveys on how trading firms perceive or 
experience NTBs. Based on such data, frequency or import coverage ratios are 
                                                 
3 This section is taken entirely from Chapter 3 “Measuring non-tariff barriers and their im-
pact on the economy” of the intermediate report delivered under this project (CASE, 2007). DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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developed.
4 These ratios are subsequently used to calculate tariff equivalents. Sec-
ond, price-comparison measures, where estimates of NTBs are derived based on 
differences between domestic and foreign prices.
5 Since the price impact is a gen-
eral property of NTBs, such a price comparison can pick up the net effects of all 
NTBs that are present in a market. Percentage differences between the prices are 
calculated, comparable to tariffs, which are commonly referred to as tariff equiva-
lents. However, the drawback of such a method is the impossibility to identify 
NTBs nature since it is not clear which concrete NTBs cause those price differ-
ences. Quantity measure would be preferable to price measure. Thus, we move to 
the third method - quantity-impact measures. The objective here is to estimate the 
potential trade in the absence of NTBs and to compare it to the actual trade. This 
method involves estimation of econometric models of trade determination based 
on theoretical models of Heckscher-Ohlin (trade based on comparative advantage), 
Helpman-Krugman (trade based on product differentiation) or gravity models. 
Under all these approaches NTBs are measured either by using residuals of the 
estimated regressions as representing NTBs or various dummy variables. Besides 
the above three general methods there are also special purpose methods
6, exten-
sively described in the study of Deardorff and Stern (1998). Below we discuss the 
results of the three types of studies on NTBs in CEE and CIS countries. 
 
 
2.1.  Studies based on frequency-type method  
 
Several studies look at the issue of border effects
7 in the enlarged EU economic 
space in the context of technical barriers to trade (e.g. Brenton and Vancauteren, 
2001; Chen, 2004). However, evidence on CEECs countries is still quite scarce.  
                                                 
4 The frequencies are calculated for commodity categories that were subject to some identi-
fiable NTB in a specific year. The number of product categories subject to NTBs is then 
expressed as a percentage of the total number of product categories in each commodity 
group. This is referred to as the frequency ratio. The import coverage ratios are calculated 
by determining the value of imports of each product subject to NTBs, aggregating by ap-
plicable commodity group, and expressing the value of imports covered as a percentage of 
total imports in the corresponding commodity group. 
5 Provided the data on prices is available. 
6 Special purpose methods include: (1) elasticity estimation; (2) determinants of variations 
in elasticity estimates; (3) variations in effects of NTBs over time; (4) binding of NTBs; 
(5) risk characteristics of NTBs. 
7 Exchanges between economic actors are normally found to cost more if they cross any 
kind of administrative borders. The difference in the costs involved in moving products 
within a country or between countries is underlying the nature of border effect. Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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Manchin and Pinna (2003) study differences in the importance of border effects 
in trade in products with different magnitude of technical barriers. They examine 
bilateral trade flows in the CEECs using data for the period 1992–1998 between a 
sample of accession countries (Cyprus, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia and Poland) and 
the EU. Manchin and Pinna (2003) use the same Commission’s review of the im-
pact of the Single Market in the EU as Vancauteren and Weiserbs (2003). They 
group products using the approach adopted by the EU to remove technical barri-
ers: old approach, other approach (including mutual recognition, new approach), 
and mixed approach (includes products where old approach and other approach are 
applicable). They find that the border effects are the largest for old approach prod-
ucts, where they expect to have the most important technical barrier to trade due to 
complicated harmonization procedures. In the absence of border costs their coun-
tries of interest would trade between themselves 114 times more in old approach 
products, while only 25 times more in other approach products. However, the au-
thors notice that the estimated border effects seem to be too large to be consistent 
only with the presence of trade barriers.  
Another study of Chevassus-Lozza et al. (2005) aims to assess the role of 
NTBs in eight EU new member states
8 exports but only in agri-food sector. The 
authors divide NTBs into three categories - sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures, quality measures, and import certificates - and include them as dummy 
variables into their gravity model. They compare the role of various trade barriers 
in a cross-section design (for 1999 and 2003) and thus answer the question about 
the changing role of NTBs over time. The data on NTBs is taken from the French 
Customs source
9 that hosts the electronic version of EU border regulations. They 
find that in 1999 these three NTBs indeed represented serious obstacles to trade. In 
2003 their role has diminished, most notably for SPS and quality measures. The 
change of size of their coefficients
10 between 1999 and 2003 can be interpreted as 
an indication of the progress made by these countries in implementing the acquis 
communautaire in the pre-accession period. 
In case of CIS countries, the availability of NTBs datasets and empirical evi-
dence on their impact on trade flows between them and the EU is very limited. In 
most cases the existing international datasets contain rather outdated, or incom-
plete (in terms of country coverage) or highly aggregated data on NTBs. For ex-
ample, CIS countries are included into the UNCTAD’s Trade Analysis and Infor-
mation System (TRAINS) but the latest NTB data are from 1997 for most of them.  
                                                 
8 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
9 www.douane.gouv.fr. 
10 The coefficient for SPS has changed from -0.63 to -0.25; quality: from -0.31 to -0.07. DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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In spite of these shortcomings, the UNCTAD TRAINS data have been fre-
quently used in studies on the role of NTBs in the world trade, including CIS 
countries. The most recent among them is the World Bank study by Kee, Nicita 
and Olerreaga (2006) that provides estimates for three measures of trade protection 
in the form of tariff equivalents – trade restrictiveness indices. These measures 
include: (i) trade restrictiveness index (TRI), which is an indicator of country’s 
trade protection that measures trade distortions (or domestic inefficiencies) of 
country’s trade policies imposed on itself (ii) overall trade restrictiveness index 
(OTRI), which reflects restrictiveness of country’s trade policy imposed on its 
importers (import losses), and (iii) market access overall trade restrictiveness in-
dex (MA-OTRI) which captures trade barriers of other countries imposed on ex-
ports of each separate country.  
Ad-valorem equivalents were estimated for certain NTBs
11 and agricultural 
domestic support for each 6-digit HS category and for 104 countries. Data on core 
NTBs was obtained from UNCTAD’s TRAINS database, whereas on agricultural 
support – from WTO members’ notifications (previously constructed by Hoek-
man, Ng and Olearreaga, 2004). Final estimates of this several-stage study, in 
particular (i) import demand elasticities; (ii) ad-valorem equivalents of core NTBs 
and agricultural domestic support (in percentage form), and (iii) trade restrictive-
ness indices
12 (computed for broad aggregates: overall trade, agriculture and 
manufacturing) can be freely accessed through the World Bank trade website.  
Obtained results allowed authors to make the following conclusions on trade 
barriers across countries: (i) NTBs have a significant contribution to global trade 
protectionism – on average the additional 70% of the level of trade restrictiveness 
imposed by tariffs (the importance of NTBs is stronger in developed countries); 
(ii) poor countries tend to have more restrictive trade regimes and, at the same 
time, higher trade barriers on their exports; (iii) trade restrictiveness is generally 
higher in agriculture (in import markets), and agricultural exporters usually face 
higher trade barriers on export markets.  
These general findings have relevance to CIS countries covered by the study 
(Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) as well. For instance, market 
access overall trade restrictiveness index (MA-OTRI) for Ukrainian exporters in 
the world markets equals on average 15.2%, while this index goes up to 49.2% for 
Ukrainian agricultural producers and goes down to 11.4% for its manufacturing 
producers. For comparison, the respective estimates for the Russian exporters are 
                                                 
11 The following NTB measures were included: price and quantity control measures, tech-
nical regulations, and monopolistic measures. 
12 As well as additional indicators: dead weight losses due to the existing trade restrictive-
ness (TRI), import losses due to overall trade restrictiveness (OTRI). Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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as follows: 12.2%, 46.7% and 9.7%, while exporters from the EU encounter on 
average trade restrictiveness of similar magnitude 15.1%, 34.3% and 12.2% (see 
Table 1). In regard to trade barriers imposed by CIS countries on their imports, the 
authors found that Moldova maintained one of the most liberal trade regimes. Still, 
Ukraine’s protection of its agricultural market is the highest among the considered 
countries. 
 
Table 1. Trade Restrictiveness Indices of CIS countries  
  Ukraine Russia Moldova  Belarus  Kazakhstan 
Market Access Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (MA-OTRI), % 
Overall  15.2 12.2 25.9 15.4 15.3 
Agriculture 49.2 46.7 43.3 33.8 62.4 
Manufacturing 11.4  9.7  18.0  14.7  11.2 
Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI), % 
Overall 21.6  22.6  7.4  15.9  14.0 
Agriculture 46.4 33.4 16.8 31.2 32.9 
Manufacturing 18.4  20.4  5.7  13.7  11.7 
Source: Kee, Nicita and Olerreaga, 2006. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the most complete NTB database in terms of dif-
ferent types of NTBs and time coverage, developed for Ukraine, is the one con-
structed by Movchan and Eremenko (2003), following the UNCTAD’s TRAINS 
methodology. In particular, this dataset reports the presence or absence of a non-
tariff barrier in each HS 6-digit tariff line over the period starting from 1993. A 
broad range of import-related NTBs applied in Ukraine has been used for con-
struction of this database, including core NTBs but not only them (see the full list 
of NTBs in the Annex1 Table A1). Such a complete NTBs database makes it pos-
sible to compute various types of NTB intensity indices - in the form of simple 
frequency or import-weighted (import coverage) ratios.  
The same authors (Movchan and Eremenko, 2003) computed an augmented 
weighted index of NTBs which allows differentiating intensity of various types of 
the NTBs and aggregating them into one measure
13. Having considered NTBs 
applied in Ukraine between 1994 and 2001 the author concluded: (i) in the studied 
period aggregate intensity of non-tariff protection increased by almost 97% with a 
                                                 
13 According to Movchan and Eremenko (2003), augmented weighted index of NTBs is a 
“compound additive index that incorporates a spectrum of non-tariff barriers applied in the 
country weighted on the value of imports. It applies the changeable indicator of the non-
tariff protection for each type of the NTB what allows preserving positive characteristics 
of frequency measures like transparency and universality, at the same time adding flexibil-
ity and better representation of reality”. DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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peak in 1999–2000 and gradual reduction afterwards, (ii) evolution of different 
types of non-tariff protection revealed that core NTBs, with most harmful influ-
ence on trade, had been gradually reduced starting 1998 for most commodities, on 
the contrary the role of technical barriers
14 had been steadily increasing; (iii) food 
products were the most heavily affected by NTBs (Movchan, 2003).  
Later, these findings were developed further. For example, the augmented 
weighted index of core NTBs (quotas, licenses, excise charges, anti-dumping 
measures, and minimum custom value) applied to imports in Ukraine during the 
1999–2004, was computed and used in Pindyuk (2006). NTB index calculations 
used in this study suggest that agriculture, food and agricultural processing, fish-
ing, extraction of coal have been the most protected sectors in Ukraine in terms of 
NTBs (see Table 2). The NTB indices for these sectors even increased by the end 
of the respective period while protection of most of the other sectors has been 
gradually declining. 
In the World Bank’s “Ukraine Trade Policy Study” (World Bank, 2004) fre-
quency indices were calculated for longer period of 1993–2004 which illustrated 
longer-term dynamics of NTBs in this country. During the analyzed period the 
simple frequency index calculated for 17 non-tariff measures including core and 
technical regulations measures
15 increased by more than twice from 7.2 to 17.5% 
whereas import coverage index rose ten times from 1993 to 2004. There was a 
considerable escalation of the number of applied safety control measures and 
compulsory standards certification during this period, which have become the 
major component of the NTB index of Ukraine. In 2001–2002 the NTB frequency 
index was slightly reduced due to elimination of minimum custom value regula-
tions and easing state procurement rules, but in 2002–2004 it grew again stipulated 
by extension of the list of compulsory certification and introduction of new risk-
control measures by the Custom Service of Ukraine
16. The authors conclude that 
Ukraine seems to be rather liberal in terms of applied official core NTBs frequen-
cies, if compared with OECD countries, and then mentions that informal NTBs 
can also play a substantial role. Therefore, business surveys investigating effective 
trade barriers and business climate in the country are of great importance for get-
ting a full picture of NTBs. 
 
 
                                                 
14 They include safety standards and ecological control, compulsory standards certification, 
permits for medicine imports.  
15 See Appendix for their list. 
16 World Bank (2004), pp. 48-49.  Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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2.2.  Special surveys 
 
Another kind of frequency-type measures is based on special surveys. One of 
the recent surveys was conducted for five Western Balkan countries (Frohlich, 
2005), for which the prospect of the EU membership was confirmed during the 
Thessaloniki summit in June 2003 (Albania; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatia; 
Macedonia; Serbia and Montenegro). Overall, 2,166 companies from five coun-
tries took part in the survey. As to the NTBs, companies were asked to rank vari-
ous barriers in accordance with their importance. The highest score was received 
by technical standards and certification, followed by quality control and consumer 
protection. Customs procedures are on the third place, followed by access to final 
end-users. Company registration procedures seem to be relatively less important, 
taking the last – fifth place. However, it should be noted that the difference in av-
erage grades given to various NTBs is not large: on the four-point scale the highest 
rank (technical standards, certification) on average stands at 3.8, while the lowest 
(company registration) – at 2.9.  
Another survey, which served as a basis for the above mentioned Western Bal-
kan survey, was conducted in 4,400 enterpirses in 10 then EU candidate countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lat-
via, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) plus Croatia (Frohlich, 
2003). The total of 2,725 companies (62% of the target) were interviewed. The 
survey included an assessment of company compliance with the acquis – in gen-
eral and by areas; problem areas in the acquis implementation; and cost of compli-
ance with the acquis for the Single Market. Four-point scale was used, with the 
score of 4 corresponding to full compliance, and 1 – very low compliance. Ac-
cording to the survey results, companies assessed their general level of compliance 
at 2.2 on average. Compliance with the following areas: consumer protection and 
producer liability; product certification, technical regulations, standards; and work 
safety were ranked the highest (2.7). Food quality and safety on average was rated 
at the level 2.6. The lowest scores were attributed to environmental protection; 
labels, trademarks, patents; and rules of competition (2.5). The same questions of 
compliance were addressed from a different angle: assessing the expected difficul-
ties accompanying implementation of the acquis. Here the area of product certifi-
cation, technical regulations, standards was ranked the highest – 2.8; and food 
quality and safety – the lowest (1.9). 
Jakubiak et al. (2006) study investigated NTBs based on the surveyed sample 
of 510 exporters, most of which were rather small companies (less than 50 work-
ers) owned by Ukrainian private capital. Most of them were involved in trade rela-
tions, exporting about half of their production, mostly to the EU. The survey fo-DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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cused on questions relevant mostly to manufacturing producers and covered such 
areas as certification of origin, customs procedures and technical standards. The 
EU custom procedures were assessed as relatively easy and not so costly by 
Ukrainian exporters (over 72% of firms did not see any problems with them). Ac-
cording to the survey, respondents on average spent 6% of export value on custom 
clearance and waited on average one day on the border with the EU. Most of the 
large companies claimed that costs of compliance with the EU’s technical regula-
tions were about identical as with domestic technical regulations. On the contrary, 
small private firms, especially those exporting agricultural products, consider that 
the cost of meeting EU technical standards is higher comparing to domestic ones. 
However, there is no big difference between large and small companies in percep-
tion of product quality requirements as the most restrictive technical standard.  
When asked about the ratio of costs incurred to meet EU’s technical require-
ments to total production costs, respondents provided rough estimates rather than 
calculated numbers. According to them, average level of costs across the sample 
equalled to 13.9% of production, while this number for large foreign-owned firms 
was greater than the average and constituted 16.1%. Breakdown by the sectors 
shows that companies selling products of metallurgy and chemistry industries 
spent the least on upgrading the commodities up to EU requirements, while textile 
and apparel industry spent the most (see Table 2 for more detailed information). 
As to the cost of passing the testing and certification procedures as a share of total 
production costs, it was estimated as 4.2% on average with greater burden for 
small firms than for large. Most companies reported that there was high degree of 
duplication of their efforts due to necessity to test production for both Ukrainian 
and EU requirements.  
Trade barriers (tariff and non-tariff) encountered by Moldovan exporters to the 
EU market were studied in Diomin et al. (2005). The study presents results of the 
survey conducted among 95 Moldovan commodity exporters. They were asked to 
prioritize main obstacles to trade with the EU. Most Moldovan exporters perceived 
high tariffs as the main obstacle in exporting to the EU (about 20% of surveyed 
exporters indicated it as the strongest obstacle). Competitive pressure from the EU 
producers (about 15%) and limited possibilities of getting visas (14%) were per-
ceived as the next most important impediments to trade with the EU. On the con-
trary, Moldovan businesses in general considered conformity with EU standards 
and obtaining the certificate of origin as not very important obstacles to their trade 
with the EU (5% and 6% respectively).  
Rutherford et al. (2005) estimated the ad valorem equivalents of barriers to for-
eign direct investment in service sectors in their assessment of the impact of Rus-
sia’s WTO accession on poverty. These sectors included: telecommunications; 
science and science servicing; financial services; railway transportation; truck Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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transportation; pipelines transportation; maritime transportation; air transportation; 
and other transportation. The authors first commissioned surveys in telecommuni-
cations; banking and securities; and maritime and air transportation services by 
Russian research institutes. Then they used these surveys, the supplementary data 
and research results of Kimura et al. (2004a, 2004b, 2004c) to estimate reduction 
in barriers to FDI based on assessing the regulatory environment. The estimated ad 
valorem tariff equivalents to FDI range from 33% (in telecommunications, sci-
ence, railway, truck and pipelines transportation) to 90–95% (air transportation 
and maritime transportation) (see Table 2).  
The same methodology of measuring barriers to trade/foreign direct invest-
ments in services, as in Rutherford et al. (2005), was employed in Copenhagen 
Economics, IER, and OEI (2005) for Ukraine and then updated in IER (2007). 
This work modelled different scenarios of Ukraine’s WTO accession and esti-
mated respective economic impact of their implementation. The authors estimated 
ad valorem tariff equivalents of barriers to FDI in three Ukrainian services sectors: 
telecommunications (fixed, Internet, mobile), railway transport (freight and pas-
senger) and finance (banking, insurance, securities) (see Table 2). Their estimates 
revealed that financial services were the most protected among service sectors 
(about 30% ad valorem tariff equivalent), followed by railways (16.7%) and tele-
communications (4.9%). Hence the estimated barriers to foreign provision of ser-
vices were significantly lower than in the case of Russia. 
 
 
2.3.  Gravity model approach 
 
The literature quantifying NTB effects in the context of EU enlargement with 
the help of gravity models is quite scarce. To the best of our knowledge, there are 
three studies examining regional trade and welfare implications of NTBs in the 
context of EU enlargement. These are Lejour et al (2001); Nahuis (2004) and 
Philippidis and Carrington (2005); yet, the latter basically replicates the Lejour et 
al (2001), using spatial econometric procedures. 
Lejour et al. (2001) used WorldScan CGE model for the world economy. The 
accession countries were divided into three regions: Poland, Hungary, and CEEC5 
(Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania); Baltic countries were 
not included. The authors distinguished sixteen sectors: agriculture, raw materials, 
ten manufacturing sectors and four service sectors. They derived NTB equivalents 
based on gravity model approach. The estimated ad-valorem NTB equivalents 
ranged from 0% to 17.7% among sectors, in particular for agriculture – 17.7%, DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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trade services – 17.2%, textile and leather – 14.5%, non-metallic minerals – 
13.1%, food processing – 11.7%. Noteworthy, according to study’s estimation, 
trade in services (financial services, transport and communication) was well liber-
alized (with 0% tariff equivalents). 
The same approach was used by Nahuis (2004) – incorporating EU-
membership dummy into his gravity equation. In particular, the author assumed 
that dummy indicating whether both countries are EU members provides insight 
into the impact of the internal market access. The estimations exploited the fact 
that the ‘old’ EU members belonged to a single market since 1992. Therefore, the 
trade levels between two EU members when compared to trade between two simi-
lar non-EU members gave indicstion on the NTBs which the single market suc-
ceeded to remove.  
Similarly to Lejour et al. (2001), Nahuis (2004) did estimation for sixteen in-
dustries; the CEECs were divided into three regions: Poland, Hungary, and Rest 
CEEC. Main findings of Nahuis (2004) lay in line with the previous study; still 
after transforming coefficients of EU membership dummies into tariff equivalents 
the NTB estimate appeared to be higher (up to 30% for some industries: agricul-
ture – 30%, textiles and leather – 19%, trade services – 17%, etc.). 
However, the gravity specification employed in Lejour et al. (2001) was re-
cently criticized and revisited by Philippidis and Carrington (2005). The authors 
claim that the impact of Single Market access is misrepresented due to the absence 
of spatial effects in their gravity specification.  
Philippidis and Carrington (2005) employed spatial econometrics procedures in 
gravity modelling and applied the same CGE dataset and aggregation as Lejour et 
al. (2001) to ascertain the degree of bias on gravity estimates of predicted trade. 
Authors explain that in the presence of spatial effects (namely spatial dependence, 
caused by various degrees of spatial aggregation, spatial externalities and spillover 
effects, and spatial structure of heteroskedasticity) traditional econometric tech-
niques produce inefficient and, given the implicit misspecification, biased esti-
mates. Their results suggest that there was a systematic overestimation of NTBs 
for eleven sectors when traditional econometric techniques were used. In particular 
NTB tariff equivalent for agriculture amounted to 7.5%, food processing – 9.4%, 
textiles and leather - 11%, non-metallic minerals – 11%, etc.  
As for the CIS, we are only aware of a study on Ukraine. The gravity approach 
for obtaining NTB estimates was applied in the recent study on feasibility of free 
trade between the EU and Ukraine undertaken by CEPS ‘The Prospects of Deep 
Free Trade between the European Union and Ukraine (CEPS, 2006). Removing 
non-tariff barriers was included as an important characteristic of deep institutional 
and regulatory convergence in the framework of a deep integration scenario. The Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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authors used the gravity model technique to estimate the implicit NTBs at the sec-
toral level among the regions of their CGE model. In particular, they introduced 
dummy variables for different country groupings - EU members, accession coun-
tries (CEEC and SEEC) or other countries - expecting that trade usually would be 
greater if the two countries belonged to the same trade block. The estimated coef-
ficients of these dummies were later transferred into ad-valorem tariff equivalents 
of trade barriers between countries17. The resulting estimates of NTBs for non-EU 
countries including Ukraine appeared to be rather large, ranging from 20% for 
textiles to 40% for food products. 
 





























Agriculture 11  27.8     
Forestry   22.4     
Food processing  11  31.9     
Fishing   33.5     
Extraction of energy materials    17.1     
Extraction of coal    19.1     
Extraction of non-energy materials    14.3     
Textile and apparel    13.9     
Textiles and leather  19       
Leather and footwear    17.2     
Wood   14.2     
Paper   9.7     
Coke and oil refining    18.9     
Rubber and plastic goods    12.5     
Other non-metal mineral products    10.0     
Metals 5       
Iron and steel    8.1     
Chemistry and petrochemical  5  16.7     
Machinery and equipment  12  11.2     
Electrical and electronic equipment   14.2     
Transport equipment    11.4     
Other production    12.4     
                                                 
17 There is neither description of the methodology for doing this transformation nor the 
resulting estimates of ad-valorem tariff equivalents of trade barriers presented in this study.  DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
 

















Electricity, gas and water supply    5.9     
Telecommunications       33 
- fixed      5.2   
- Internet      3.4   
- mobile      6.1   
Financial services:        36 
- banking      21.9   
- insurance      36.0   
- securities      28.7   
Railway transportation      16.7  33 
Science & science servicing        33 
Truck transportation        33 
Pipelines transportation        33 
Maritime transportation        95 
Air transportation        90 
Other transportation        33 
Notes: 
* Percentage of total year production costs spent in order to ensure products compliance 
with the EU norms, Ukraine, 2006. 
** Augmented weighted index for NTBs (quotas, licenses, excise charges, anti-dumping 
measures, and minimum custom value), Ukraine, 2004. 
*** Ad valorem tariff equivalents of barriers to FDI applied against foreign providers of 
services, Ukraine, 2005.  
**** Ad valorem tariff equivalents of barriers to FDI in service sectors applied against 
foreign providers of services, Russia, 2005. 
 
 
2.4.  Summary 
 
•  With a reduction in tariffs in the framework of the WTO liberalization, 
non-tariff barriers have become leading component of trade protection 
measures applied by countries throughout the world. Therefore, closer 
market integration that envisages reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade 
in goods, as well as lessening barriers to FDI, usually brings more eco-
nomic gains for trading partners than the mere tariff reduction.    
•  Indirect estimates of NTBs obtained through a gravity model approach 
are usually higher than estimates of other approaches (e.g. frequency in-
dices), which use direct evidence on the prevalence of NTBs. The former 
usually take into account the broader range of non-tariff barriers since Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
 
CASE Network Reports No. 88  20 
they capture all existing non-tariff barriers to trade (including informal 
measures) thus providing the upper bound of estimated NTBs. Gravity 
estimations can be used to measure how NTBs prevent trade between 
countries from its potential, whereas frequency indices per se do not 
measure the influence of NTBs on trade. Business surveys reflecting en-
trepreneurs’ perceptions are good as well at complementing the picture 
on NTBs significance to economic agents involved in foreign trade but 
their quantitative estimations are susceptible to respondent bias.        
•  Different approaches for estimating NTBs (frequency indices, gravity 
modelling or enterprises’ perception surveys, etc.) usually provide higher 
NTBs estimates for agricultural products compared to industrial prod-
ucts. NTBs estimates of non-tariff barriers to FDI and trade in services in 
general appear to be also high, especially in developing and transition 
countries.   
•  In the structure of NTBs the role of core non-tariff barriers diminishes 
while the importance of regulatory differences and technical barriers to 
trade and market access gradually increases thus stipulating the need for 
taking the latter into account while investigating the impact of NTBs on 
trade and economic performance. 
•  CIS (Ukraine and Russia): NTBs magnitude and their role in trade be-
tween EU and CIS countries as well as between CIS countries them-
selves proved to be highly significant. Business surveys conducted for 
Ukraine show that the costs of meeting EU technical standards are con-
sidered rather high and burdensome by Ukrainian producers (Jakubiak et 
al., 2006) (see Table 2). These costs are perceived the highest (reaching 
more than 30% of yearly production costs) by Ukrainian enterprises pro-
ducing wearing apparel and dressing, agricultural and food processed 
products, wood products, non-metallic mineral products.  
Estimates of barriers to FDI in services sectors derived for Ukraine and Russia 
prove existence of significant restrictions to trade and foreign investment in these 
sectors. Upper bounds of existing NTBs to EU-Ukraine trade estimated through 
gravity model approach are even greater ranging from 20 to 40% depending on 
industry (CEPS, 2006). The NTB system developed by Ukraine followed general 
trends in international trade: agriculture, food and agricultural processing, fishing, 
etc. have been the most NTB protected sectors in Ukraine; the significance of 
technical barriers have been increasing in the structure of applied NTBs (World 
Bank, 2004). DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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3. Measuring the Benefits of  
Improved Market Access 
 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
 
Market access for goods is usually defined as the conditions, including tariff 
and non-tariff measures, for the entry of specific goods into the country’s market. 
In regard to trade in services, market access is ensured via the four ways (or 
modes) of supply: cross-border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence 
(most services are traded in this way), and presence of natural persons (or move-
ment of people). Improvement of market access for goods implies reducing tariffs 
and/or non-tariff barriers (NTBs), while for services it means a removal of differ-
ent restrictions applied to services provision within the four modes
18.  
Trade-affecting NTBs work through a shift of an exporter’s cost curve hurting 
trade flows between countries, but they may also have broader market implications 
by changing the structure of domestic supply or demand (Popper et al. (2004), 
p.93). In addition, NTBs may trigger efficiency losses due to an alteration of pro-
duction technologies to meet a new technical requirement, restrain competition 
and lead to market segmentation
19. In general, protective NTBs result in gains to 
the domestic industry at the expense of domestic consumers and foreign suppliers 
(the magnitude of losses of foreign suppliers depends on the availability of alterna-
tive outlets for their products).  
The literature describes several types of empirical methodologies to assess the 
economic effects of NTBs; some of them address trade effects only, others con-
sider economic welfare effects as well. The detailed description of approaches to 
modelling and measuring the economic effects of non-tariff barriers, including 
technical measures, are provided in Maskus et al. (2001) and Beghin and Bureau 
                                                 
18 Restrictions on trade in services may include special licenses, requirements for addi-
tional diplomas, local residence of management, local professional insurance, restrictions 
on right of establishment and movement of business personnel, etc. 
19 According to Maskus et al. (2001), some NTBs, for example technical regulations, may 
also have positive effects on economic well being of market participants by remedying 
safety hazard or other market failures. The same is true for custom procedures, which are 
needed for smooth trading. These NTBs are considered trade restrictive if they are more 
stringent than necessary or inefficient.   Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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(2001). Maskus et al. (2001) differentiate approaches by methodology or model 
type alone, in particular surveys, macro-level econometric analysis, partial equilib-
rium models, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. Beghin and Bureau 
(2001) distinguish between trade-oriented and welfare-oriented approaches. Sur-
veys are usually designed to identify existing barriers to trade, measure the cost of 
compliance with these trade barriers and the extent to which they impede trade. 
Most surveys are trade-oriented and their results are usually used as inputs to a 
broader welfare-oriented analysis. Surveys can draw attention to those regulations 
that firms really care about, but firms’ quantitative estimations of the amount of 
NTBs and their economic effects may be biased (Popper et al, 2004). Macro-level 
econometric models explain trade flows in terms of a set of exogenous variables, 
which explicitly or implicitly include trade-restrictive regulatory policies and prac-
tices. Gravity-based models are an example. They provide insight to broad rela-
tionship between NTBs and trade (trade-oriented) but usually rely on the use of 
simple “count data” (e.g., the number of standards) being a poor proxy for the 
trade restrictiveness of the regulatory regime and do not allow distinguishing be-
tween important and unimportant NTBs and their effects (Popper et al, 2004).  
Partial equilibrium models investigate the effects of a particular NTB on trade 
or welfare more generally than gravity-type models. They rely on microeconomic 
theory of supply and demand in a particular industry and are used to assess in de-
tail the various effects of a particular NTB (on prices, quantity and welfare) 
(Beghin and Bureau, 2001). These models include studies using price-wedge and 
risk-based methods, sectoral models, other micro-economic approaches. These 
models do not capture spill-over effects between sectors. Data availability and 
interpretation (especially for price-wedge method) impose practical difficulties 
with partial equilibrium models (Popper et al, 2004).  
Whilst computable general equilibrium (CGE) models do capture interactions 
across all sectors of an economy and provide insight to aggregate-level economy-
wide trade and welfare effects. However, they typically lack the capacity to ac-
commodate the necessary details for industry-based, case study analyses. CGE 
models are usually based on the inputs on NTBs measures generated by surveys, 
price-wedge and other micro-based approaches.    
Below we will focus on the existing studies using CGE models to investigate 
economic impacts of reduction of NTBs in CEECs and CIS countries as we are 
going to employ such a model further in this chapter. 
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3.2.  Measuring economic impacts of a reduction of NTBs in CEECs 
and CIS countries 
 
Below we discuss three CGE studies focusing on the removal of NTBs in the 
2004 Enlargement: Lejour et. al. (2001), Philippidis and Carrington (2005) and 
Maliszewska (2004). 
Lejour et al (2001) employ the CPB’s
20 CGE model for the world economy – 
WorldScan for measuring the economic implications of the EU-enlargement 
shocks. The authors consider three such shocks: (i) a gradual removal of the re-
maining formal trade barriers in agriculture and food processing and the adoption 
of the common external tariff; (ii) accession to the internal market; and (iii) free 
movement of labor. For all three experiments, they explore the macroeconomic 
implications, namely the effects on real GDP, the volume of private consumption, 
and the terms of trade.  
The first experiment, which is a move towards a customs union, shows that 
CEECs experience an increase in GDP and consumption of 2.5% and 2.3% respec-
tively, while consumption and GDP in the EU hardly change. It also reveals that 
CEECs (except for Hungary) experience a terms-of-trade loss. In the second ex-
periment, the authors explore the implications of accession to the internal market 
by simulating a gradual abolishment of the NTBs. The macroeconomic implica-
tions of accession to the internal market turn out to be substantial for the CEECs, 
namely GDP and consumption increase by 5.3% and 9.3%, respectively. For all 
countries, consumption growth is higher than the growth in GDP because of the 
terms-of-trade gain. Overall, the economic implications for the accession counties 
in this study are significant. If we add the impact of the three shocks of enlarge-
ment for the CEECs, GDP per capita increases by more than 8%. The effects for 
the EU countries are generally positive, but modest. Also, as the study suggests, 
compared to the customs union and free movement of labour, accession to the 
internal market yields the largest economic effects.  
Philippidis and Carrington (2005) simply revisit the gravity specification em-
ployed in Lejour et al (2001). Thus, employing spatial econometric procedures, 
they apply the same CGE dataset and aggregations as Lejour et al (2001) and reas-
sess the importance of NTBs on trade flows, real growth, and real income changes. 
The authors run three model scenarios, examining the trade and welfare impacts of 
accession to the Single Market. In their baseline scenario, they simulate the re-
moval of all formal trade barriers and extending the common external tariff to 
CEECs. The second and third scenarios employ the same shocks as the baseline 
                                                 
20 CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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scenario, but including import augmenting technical change shocks to capture the 
trade costs associated with the removal of NTBs by sector associated with non-
spatial effects and spatial effects gravity estimates respectively. The authors find 
that trade diversion, resource reallocation and welfare effects from European Inte-
gration are biased upwards when not accounting for spatial effects. Thus, compar-
ing between spatial effects and non-spatial effects simulations, real growth for the 
CEECs falls by 0.25% under conditions with spatial effects. The authors report 
4.68% GDP growth in non-spatial effects scenario and 4.43% – in spatial effects 
scenario.  
There is one more paper evaluating the implications of the EU enlargement 
with the use of a computable general equilibrium model – Maliszewska (2004). 
The focus of this paper is on the accession to the Single Market. Among the 
CEECs considered in the analysis separately are modelled only Poland and Hun-
gary, the CEEC-5 aggregate contains Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Roma-
nia and Bulgaria. The model employed in Maliszewska (2004) is a standard static 
CGE model based on Harrison, Ruterford and Tarr (1994), which model NTBs 
explicitly including border costs and standard costs as discussed further in section 
5.1. Maliszewska’s (2004) analysis is based on lower protection levels in trade 
between Poland, Hungary and the EU (as there are considerable differences be-
tween tariffs reported by GTAP and applied tariffs in 1997), while Lejour et al 
(2001) use the original GTAP v.5 protection data. Therefore, Maliszewska (2004) 
welfare changes are smaller than those of Lejour et al (2001). Maliszewska (2004) 
results indicate that a steady state welfare implications of full abolition of stan-
dards and border costs amount to 7% for Hungary and 3.4% for Poland, while 
Lejour et al (2001) welfare implications of the Single Market amount to 9% of 
GDP for Hungary and 5.8% for Poland. However, the author mentions that her 
simulations not reported in the study show that results become very close to 
Lejour (2001) when she uses original GTAP protection data. 
The recent studies investigating economic impacts of trade liberalization in-
cluding NTBs reduction for CIS countries, in particular Ukraine and Russia, in-
clude Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2004), Rutherford, Tarr and Shepotylo (2004), 
Rutherford, Tarr and Shepotylo (2005), Jensen and Tarr (2007), Copenhagen Eco-
nomics, IER, and OEI (2005), and CEPS (2006).          
Potential impacts of trade liberalization within Russia’s WTO accession proc-
ess were studied in Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2004). The authors started the 
analysis with an observation that Russia had achieved a relatively good progress in 
lowering its tariffs on goods, while its barriers to foreign direct investment 
(namely, restrictions on right of establishment and movement of business person-
nel, lack of intellectual property rights protection and contract enforcement, etc.) 
in key business services sectors remained quite substantial therefore necessitating DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 88  25 
a thorough investigation of the impact of their liberalization. In this paper, the 
authors employed a 35-sector small open economy comparative static computable 
general equilibrium model of the Russian economy that allowed for Dixit-Stiglitz 
endogenous variety-productivity effects from investment and trade liberalization 
in business services, such as telecommunications, financial services, most business 
services and transportation services, and imperfectly competitive goods sectors
21. 
It was assumed that a substantial portion of business services requires FDI pro-
vided by multinationals (domestic presence) to compete well with Russian busi-
ness service providers, but cross-border service provision was also available
22. 
Four principal effects of Russia’ WTO accession were considered: 1) improved 
access to the markets of non-CIS countries in selected products; 2) tariff reduction 
on goods; 3) reduction of barriers against multinational service providers; and 4) 
improvement of the investment climate. The ad valorem equivalents of barriers to 
FDI in the Russian service sectors were estimated in accordance with the method-
ology described in Findlay and Warren (2000) (see Section 3.2.5 for more details). 
The resulting estimates suggested that Russia would gain about 3.3% of GDP or 
7.3% of Russian consumption in the medium term due to the WTO accession; in 
the long term this number would reach 11% of GDP or 23.6% of Russian con-
sumption
23. Moreover, execution of different scenarios showed that about 70% of 
the total gains from Russian WTO accession were ensured by FDI liberalization in 
services (5.2% of the welfare gains vs. 1.3% due to tariff reform only (50% reduc-
tion)). Thus, the major conclusion of the study is that the most important source of 
WTO accession gains for Russia comes from the liberalization of barriers against 
foreign direct investment in business services. As to the sector results, it was 
found that non-ferrous metals, ferrous metals and chemicals would expand their 
output the most as a result of Russia’s WTO accession (due to high export inten-
sity and exogenous increase in export prices), while machinery and equipment, 
food and light industry and construction materials would contract the most (most 
protected sectors with a relatively small share of exports). 
                                                 
21 The adopted Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier structure for business services and goods produced 
under increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition implies endogenous productiv-
ity gains from the net introduction of new varieties that appear due to reduction of invest-
ment and trade barriers.   
22 Other important assumptions about business services included: multinational service 
providers import some of their technology or management expertise as part of their deci-
sion to establish a domestic presence; and business services supplied with a domestic pres-
ence are supplied by imperfectly competitive firms, which produce a unique variety of the 
service (Jensen et al. (2004), page 3). 
23 This result was received by using the comparative steady state model.   Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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In Jensen and Tarr (2007) a computable general equilibrium model of the Ka-
zakhstan economy was employed to assess the impact of accession to the WTO 
which encompasses (1) improved market access; (2) Kazakhstan tariff reduction; 
(3) reduction of barriers to FDI for multinational service providers; and (4) reform 
of local content and VAT policies against multinational firms in the oil sector. The 
authors assumed that FDI in business services was necessary for multinationals to 
compete well with Kazakhstan business services providers, but cross-border ser-
vice provision was also present. The ad valorem equivalents of barriers to FDI 
were estimated based on detailed questionnaires completed by specialized research 
institutes in Kazakhstan. It was found that Kazakhstan would gain about 6.7% of 
the value of Kazakhstan consumption (or 3.7% of GDP) in the medium run from 
WTO accession and up to 17.5% in the long run (9.7% of GDP). The largest gains 
to Kazakhstan would derive from liberalization of barriers against multinational 
service providers, but the other three elements of WTO accession also contributed 
positively to the estimated gains.  
Impact of the WTO accession for Ukraine was studied in Copenhagen Eco-
nomics, IER, and OEI (2005). This study employed a comparative static comput-
able general equilibrium model of Ukrainian economy allowing for: production in 
perfectly and imperfectly competitive sectors (implying the appropriate standard 
assumptions discussed in Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2004)), three types of ser-
vice providers (domestic providers, domestic multinational providers and interna-
tional providers), four types of households (urban non-poor, urban poor, rural non-
poor, and rural poor) with the poor endowed with unskilled labour and non-poor 
households endowed with skilled labour and capital, full employment and full 
mobility of factors (with exemptions for mining and pipelines). To capture differ-
ent sources of economic impacts of Ukraine’s WTO accession four scenarios were 
executed: 1) reform of FDI barriers against foreign service providers in key ser-
vices sectors, in particular telecommunication and financial services (their ad 
valorem equivalents using the same approach as in Jensen et al. (2004)) tariff re-
form in accordance with the WTO commitments; 3) improved market access for 
Ukrainian exports; and 4) full WTO accession. Dynamic impacts of WTO acces-
sion with long-term capital stock adjustments were also estimated in a steady state 
model. All results presented changes of the respective variables relative to the 
benchmark year of 2002. The principal findings of the study included: full WTO 
accession would lead to gains in GDP (+2.3%) and welfare (+4.7%) in the me-
dium term and +2.8% and +5.9% respectively in the long term; major welfare 
gains would come from the reform of FDI barriers to multinationals in services 
sectors (2.3% vs. 1.9% due to tariffs reform and 0.5% due to improved market 
access), while the respective numbers for the GDP growth were 1.1%, 1.1% and 
0.1%; Ukraine’s membership in the WTO would be the most beneficial for sectors DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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with high shares of skilled labour in value added and exports in total output such 
as metallurgy, chemical industry, production of non-energy materials, coke pro-
duction, etc.), on the contrary, sectors with high level of initial tariff protection 
would contract (food processing, agriculture); FDI liberalization in services sec-
tors would stimulate largest increases in aggregate output in telecommunication 
(+3.7%) and financial intermediation (+2.7%), machinery and equipment (+4.6%), 
would impose low adjustment costs for households, both skilled and unskilled; 
welfare gains would be generated by lowering tariffs for poor households and by 
decreasing FDI barriers in services for non-poor households.   
In 2006–2007, the above study was updated in IER (2007). In particular, the 
authors changed base year for 2004, as well as elaborated new market access and 
tariff reform scenarios. As to the tariff reform, two different options of tariff re-
form for agricultural products resulting in higher and lower tariffs rates upon the 
WTO accession were considered. Moreover, each of the earlier applied scenarios 
of Ukraine’s WTO accession was executed by using three tariff datasets (base year 
2002/base tariffs 2002; base year 2004/base tariffs 2004; base year 2004/base tar-
iffs 2005
24). The obtained estimates of this study followed the major results of the 
previous version confirming the importance of service sectors reform for improv-
ing Ukraine’s welfare and GDP (Ukraine’s WTO accession would improve its 
welfare by 10.1–10.2% of which 4.8% would by derived from FDI liberalization 
in services sectors - for base tariffs of 2004; and 7.8–7.9% and 4.8% respectively 
for base tariffs of 2005). 
The expected economic impact of a free trade agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine was investigated in CEPS (2006). In particular, the authors analyzed two 
possible levels of economic integration between countries: simple integration im-
plying a mere removal of import tariffs (simple FTA scenario) vs. deep integration 
entailing the approximation of many of Ukraine’s external trade and internal regu-
latory policies, such as customs services, industrial product standards, SPS re-
quirements, competition policy, government procurement, etc., to the EU stan-
dards (FTA+ scenario). The latter would lead to a considerable reduction of exist-
ing NBTs. The authors used a multi-country general equilibrium model that was 
an adaptation of that used in Brenton and Whalley (1999). The updated version of 
the model took into account changes in economic structure and trade patterns be-
tween countries, as well as European integration possesses of Ukraine’s 
neighbours; apart from that the analysis was extended to include deeper integration 
scenario along with simple integration scenario. The model incorporated six re-
                                                 
24 This was done to model a considerable tariff reduction undertook by the Ukrainian Gov-
ernment in line with Ukraine’s WTO commitments in 2005.  Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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gions
25 breakdown of the world and eight economic sectors
26 breakdown of the 
economy. The authors used the 2001 GTAP database (whereas data on Ukraine’s 
imports and exports were updated to 2003 levels). Estimates of NTBs to be used in 
the FTA+ scenario were obtained by using the same gravity approach as in Lejour 
et al. (2001) (see Section 3.2.6 for more details). Three scenarios of gradual stages 
of market integration were executed: 1) CEESs’ accession to the EU along with 
the SEECs (South-Eastern European countries) and Turkey joining the EU cus-
toms union and the Single Market; 2) following the changes in round 1, formation 
of the EU-Ukraine simple FTA (implying elimination of tariffs and steel quota); 3) 
following the first two rounds, Ukraine’s entering into deeper FTA+ with the EU. 
In addition, there were considered short term and long term variants of the model 
(allowing for much more flexibility for both production and consumer behaviour 
to change in response to price changes).  
These simulations resulted in the following major findings: accession of the 
CEECs and SEECs to the EU is expected to be beneficial to Ukraine resulting in 
1.91% welfare gain in the short term and 3.05% in the long term; further formation 
of FTA with the EU would lead to significant increases in trade and output, par-
ticularly in metals, food processing and light manufacturing, with no gains in 
overall welfare if compared with CEEC/SEEC accession (+1.91% in the short rum 
and +2.99% in the long run if compare with the base year); establishing FTA+ 
integrating NTBs reform may significantly increase Ukrainian welfare (by +4.5%  
in the short run and +6.67% in the long run if compare with a simple FTA stage 
and by +6.5% in the short run and +9.86% in the long run if compare with the base 
year) with metals, food processing, textiles, light manufacturing expanding the 
most. The study confirms the earlier conclusions of other studies that simple free 
trade agreement would have a minor impact on economic performance of both 
FTA participants – Ukraine and even less the EU. At the same time, deeper forms 
of market integration can have a substantial impact on Ukraine’s economy in 
terms of its trade improvement and welfare gains.  
Further, Ecorys and CASE-Ukraine study (2007) analyses the implications of 
an FTA between the EU and Ukraine, while Maliszewska (2008a, 2008b) analyse 
the implications of EU-Georgia and EU-Armenia FTAs. The CGE models applied 
in those studies are a modification of Harrison-Rutherford-Tarr (1996) as in Mal-
iszewska (2004) (see section 5.1 for details). The assumptions on NTBs in the EU-
Ukraine trade are based on Jakubiak et. al. (2006). The studies on Georgia and 
                                                 
25 Ukraine, EU-15, 2004 Eastern European accession states (CEECs), South-Eastern Euro-
pean countries + Turkey (SEECs), Russia, and the Rest of the World. 
26 Food crops and animal production, minerals, food products, light manufacturing, heavy 
manufacturing, textiles, metals, services.  DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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Armenia are based on surveys on NTBs that were conducted in those countries in 
2007. The questionnaires were specifically designed for the purpose of their fur-
ther use in the modelling assumptions as discussed in the above studies. 
The Ecorys and CASE-Ukraine (2007) study analyses a few scenarios from 
limited to extended FTA with the EU following the WTO Accession of Ukraine. 
The extended liberalization scenario including full liberalization of tariffs on 
manufacturing products and a substantial reduction of agro-food tariffs, reduction 
of technical barriers to trade, barriers to trade in services and costs related to cus-
toms formalities. The welfare impact of the extended FTA is expected to reach 
around 5.3% of GDP, while the impact of the WTO Accession amounts to 0.6% of 
GDP and the impact of limited FTA amounts to 3.3% of GDP. Real wages of 
skilled and unskilled workers are expected to increase along with the income, sec-
tors expected to expand include textiles and wearing apparel, leather products, 
wood products, chemicals, metal products, electronic equipment and machinery. 
Despite significant differences in methodology these results are similar to 
CEPS(2006) in terms of welfare implications and expected sectoral output 
changes.  
In Maliszewska (2008a) a range of scenarios has been simulated, starting with 
the effects of liberalisation measures adopted by respectively Georgia (unilateral 
significant tariff liberalisation of trade in goods along with the recognition of for-
eign product standards) and the EU (granting Georgia GSP+ under its new GSP 
scheme) in 2006 (baseline scenario), which could boost the GDP growth in Geor-
gia by 1%. The simple elimination of tariffs in Georgian trade with the EU would 
not add much, since essentially only the remaining agro-food tariffs would be re-
duced or dismantled. Finally, the simulations incorporate possible confidence and 
synergy effects that could come from the binding in of the multiple liberalization 
and reform measures that Georgia has made in the recent past. These confidence 
effects can be modeled as reductions in the perceived risk premium attached to 
investment in Georgia, which could lead to additional welfare gains of 2.4% of 
GDP. Further gains of 1.7% of GDP could be reaped from a deep integration sce-
nario that would lock in further domestic policy changes such as conformity with 
EU regulatory standards, improvement in customs procedures and further facilita-
tion of FDI in service sectors. If as a result of a Deep FTA and further flanking 
measures such as on competition and corruption Georgia achieved a notable reduc-
tion in the perceived risk premium on investment, reflecting a sustained re-
branding of Georgia as a favorable and safe place to invest, the total gains on the 
top of the ones achieved out of the 2006 liberalisation might reach around 6.5% of 
GDP. 
Maliszewska (2008b) is based on a similar methodology. A set of scenarios 
ranges from the liberalization in the EU-Armenia bilateral trade that took place in Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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2006 (baseline scenario) to a deep integration scanario. The analysis using a CGE 
model indicates that the welfare gains for Armenia from tariff liberalisation on its 
and the EU side respectively that took place in 2006 (in particular Armenia's uni-
lateral lowering of import tariffs and EU's granting Armenia tariff preferences 
under the general arrangement of its new GSP) are likely to be small (less than 
0.4% of GDP). Also the additional impact of possible future EU-Armenia simple 
FTA involving further tariff reductions is likely to be negligible. Further, a deep 
integration scenario has been analyzed. It involves a more complete elimination of 
barriers to trade and investment implying reductions in, or elimination of regula-
tory and behind-the-border impediments to trade, which may relate to customs 
procedures, product standards and certifications procedures and market access for 
foreign providers of services. The potential additional welfare gains are estimated 
to amount to about 3.38% of GDP. If comprehensive reforms brought about by 
deeper integration along with additional flanking measures related to competition 
policy and corruption led to a re-branding of Armenia as a favourable investment 
location, a reduction of the risk premium on investment could work as an addi-
tional mechanism for boosting both investment and GDP growth. If this was to 
occur, from our model simulations, we envisage the possibility of additional eco-
nomic gains from a Deep FTA+ reaching as much as 8% of GDP.  
 
 
3.3.  Conclusions 
 
The overview of various studies on identification and estimation of NTBs and 
their economic impact allows drawing the following general conclusions:  
•  Studies estimating the impact of Eastern EU enlargement and accession 
of the CEES countries to the Single European Market report that internal 
market access and lessening of NTBs may lead to considerable aggregate 
trade increase for CEES countries well exceeding trade increase for the 
‘old’ EU members. The estimated non-tariff barriers to trade differ sub-
stantially between sectors: agriculture and food products, trade services, 
textiles and leather, non-metallic minerals and electronic equipment were 
the most protected. As a result, these particular sectors may benefit the 
most from getting access to the EU internal market and lessening non-
tariff protection. The reviewed studies revealed rather low barriers to 
FDI and trade in services between CEES countries and the ‘old’ EU 
members indicating to high level of liberalization in this important area 
of international economic relations.  DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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•  Previous studies analyzing the impact of a FTA between the EU and se-
lected CIS countries conclude that simple elimination of tariffs in trade is 
not going to have a big economic impact as several CIS countries have 
already preferential access to the EU market. However, the deep integra-
tion tackling non-tariff barriers to trade and leading to a significant im-
provement of the business environment can have potentially very signifi-
cant impact on the CIS countries’ GDP, employment and international 
trade. In the long run the estimated gains from deep integration can reach 
up to 8–10% of GDP. 
 Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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4. Assessment of NTBs in  
Selected CIS Countries 
In this section we analyse the level of non-tariff barriers in the studied coun-
tries to derive their numerical tariff equivalents that can be used in the modelling 
of improved market access. The types of NBTs considered in this review include: 
standard costs, border costs and barriers to trade in services. Standard costs are 
expenses born by exporting companies in order to satisfy the EU product require-
ments, such as labelling, product redesign etc. Border costs emerge due to the 
existence of borders and customs formalities, which involve delays and various 
kinds of administrative costs. Finally, barriers to trade in services refer to dis-
criminatory measures faced by foreign service providers in respect to their statu-
tory funds, supply of particular services, establishing branches etc. We review the 
level of legal harmonization of technical regulations and product standards with 
the EU ones, the availability of conformity assessment centres, the costs of ex-
ports/imports and the business environment in our 5 selected countries: Russia, 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Then we make assumptions on the 
reduction of NTBs following the FTAs with the EU in order to assess their eco-
nomic implications using a CGE model. 
 
 
4.1.  Standard costs  
 
Standards and technical regulations such as product certification requirements, 
performance mandates, testing procedures, conformity assessments, labelling 
standards, exist to protect consumer safety or to achieve other goals. Product stan-
dards overcome existing market failures and have a positive effect on domestic 
welfare. On the other hand, standards can raise substantially both start-up (fixed 
costs) and production costs (variable costs) by requiring additional inputs of la-
bour and capital; they constitute additional production costs firms have to incur in 
order to export to a specific market. Complying with different standards can add 
costs and limit export competitiveness of domestic producers. International har-
monization of product standards may diminish these costs since the compliance DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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with a single standard eliminates the multiple costs that are otherwise incurred by 
exporters in non-harmonizing countries (Maskus et al., 2005). 
CIS countries often lack adequate financial and human resources for the re-
forming and upgrading of their conformity assessment infrastructure and for the 
harmonisation of national standards with the international including the EU ones. 
Due to differing regulations national exporters incur high standards cost (i.e. costs 
relating to observance of the international and EU technical norms) which consti-
tute a significant barrier to trade with the EU and the world. 
In our modelling exercise the standards costs are determined as an increase of 
the cost of production incurred by domestic producers of CIS countries exporting 
their products to the EU. They are modelled as additional value added in each 
sector where trade takes place. This approach does not take into account the fixed 
cost elements of implementation of new standards. It is expected that the align-
ment of the standards and technical regulation systems of the considered CIS 
countries with the EU norms and requirements will lead to a considerable reduc-
tion of existing standards costs associated with exports to the EU. We first develop 
assumptions on the current (2006) level of these costs across countries and then 
assess the possible magnitude of their reductions as a result of regulatory conver-
gence with the EU. 
In the absence of business surveys or empirical studies providing quantitative 
estimates of standards costs in the Caucasus region and Russia, we will base our 
assumptions regarding the current level of standards costs on the survey of Ukrain-
ian exporters to the EU conducted by CASE and CASE Ukraine in 2006 (Jakubiak 
et al 2006). In this survey, over 500 Ukrainian companies from different economic 
sectors were asked to assess costs associated with meeting EU technical standards 
and the duplication of efforts related to compliance with both national and the EU 
standards. According to this survey, Ukrainian companies exporting to the EU 
claim that they had to increase their production costs by 13.9% on average in 
2005–2006 in order to ensure compatibility of their products with the EU technical 
requirements (see Table 2). By commodity breakdown, companies selling prod-
ucts of metallurgy and chemical industry spent the least on upgrading the com-
modities up to the EU requirement, while appropriate expenses of companies pro-
ducing agricultural and food products, machinery, apparels, etc. are comparatively 
higher (Jakubiak et al 2006).  
All CIS countries have inherited the same standardisation and certification sys-
tem from the Soviet Union based on the mandatory GOST standards. Presently, 
conformity with obsolete GOST standards is still technically required in almost all 
CIS countries (with a notable exception of Georgia as discussed below). Stan-
dardisation systems in the CIS countries remain excessively bureaucratic and cen-Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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tralised, poorly integrated into the international system. As a result, exporters from 
CIS countries encounter the similar problems with complying with the EU and 
international standards, incur high costs that arise from the duplication of efforts 
related to compliance with both national and international standards. At the same 
time, CIS countries gradually undertake the replacement of old GOST standards 
with international and the EU standards and technical regulations, and reform their 
standardisation and certification systems in line with the implementation of their 
commitments under the WTO and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
with the EU. The progress of undertaking such reforms differs across countries. 
Therefore, we assume that the estimates of the Ukrainian survey can be applicable 
to other CIS countries, including Russia, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, but 
with the adjustments for regional and country’s status quo regarding the reforming 
and upgrading of standardisation and quality assurance systems.  
To develop assumptions on the current level of standards costs in the countries 
of our interest we suggest taking the Ukrainian estimations as a benchmark and 
adjusting them in line with the following considerations: 
•  The level of harmonization of national legislation, technical regulations 
and standards with the EU and international norms and standards: the 
higher level of harmonization of technical regulations and standards of a 
particular sector/economy, the lower costs of compliance are for export-
ers to the EU markets.  
•  The status of the WTO membership: stage of accession/membership. 
The longer membership in the WTO the higher level of compliance of 
national standards and procedures with international standards is, thus 
the lower costs of compliance costs for exporters of all sectors. The level 
of implementation of the WTO commitments by the country is also im-
portant and should be taken into account during the analysis.     
•  The availability and development of the quality assurance infrastructure 
and capacities in the country (accreditation bodies, metrology institutes, 
accredited conformity assessment and certification bodies and their rec-
ognition by the EU, etc.). The more developed the countries quality in-
frastructure system and capacities the lower standards costs for all sec-
tors are. 
•  The formal EU policy and existing requirements towards the particular 
products originating from CIS countries: recognition of conformity cer-
tificates issued by CIS countries, availability of mutual recognition 
agreements, other bilateral agreements, collaboration and membership in 
the European and international accreditation organizations, etc. Recogni-
tion of conformity certificates of the CIS countries by the EU for particu-DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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lar products may significantly reduce the costs of compliance with the 
EU standards for appropriate exporters. 
 
4.1.1.  Ukraine: a benchmark  
 
In February 2008, the WTO General Council has approved Ukraine’s WTO ac-
cession protocol
27 where the country has committed itself to ensure full compli-
ance of its legislation with the WTO TBT Agreement and to abide by the provi-
sions of the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application 
of Standards from the date of its accession to the WTO without any transition pe-
riods. Also, according to Ukraine’s commitments, all national and regional stan-
dards will be voluntary, except those referred to in technical regulations intended 
to protect national security interests, prevent deceptive practices, protect the life 
and health of people, animals or plants, as well as protect the environment. 
Ukraine will continue giving priority consideration to international standards, 
guidelines and recommendations, as a basis for Ukraine's own standards, technical 
regulations and associated conformity assessment procedures. By 30 December 
2011, all of Ukraine’s technical regulations will be based on the relevant interna-
tional standards. Ukraine will also continue to reduce the number of categories of 
products subject to mandatory certification, and broaden acceptance of supplier's 
declaration of conform in relation to the relevant technical regulation, prior to the 
end of year 2011 (see Ukraine WP Report 2008).   
In 2000, Ukraine launched a program to align its standardisation and quality 
assurance system with the EU and international requirements. During 2001–2006 
period, new laws on standardisation, on metrology, on conformity assessment, on 
accreditation of conformity assessment bodies and on consumer protection were 
adopted. In 2006, the government approved the State Program on Standardisation 
for the 2006–2010 envisaging harmonization of about 8,500 of Ukrainian stan-
dards with international and EU standards and norms during this period.  
According to the State Committee of Ukraine for Technical Regulation and 
Consumer Policy (the DSSU)
28, until 2007 17 EU Directives have been approxi-
mated in Ukrainian national legislation as technical regulations
29, and other 22 
                                                 
27 Ukraine has been in the process of the WTO accession during 1993-2008.  
28 The DSSU is the central body of executive power in the area of standardization and 
technical regulation, as well as a specially authorized central body of executive power in 
the area of conformity assessment. 
29 Covering the safety of low-voltage equipment; electric household refrigerating devices; 
electromagnetic compatibility; non-automatic weighing devices; and the safety of gas Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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technical regulations are under development. However, at the end of 2007, only 
19.2% of standards were harmonised with the international and the EU ones. From 
its independence in 1991, Ukraine has adopted over 7000 national standards, 51% 
of which are the harmonized standards, while 879 old standards have been elimi-
nated. 
 
Table 3. Standards, in effect in Ukraine (as of 01.10.2007) 







Total 25606  18110  7031  465 
Harmonized   5137  1552  3585  0 
Level of harmonization, %  19.2  8.6  51.0  0 
Source: The DSSU.  
 
According to the DSSU, the level of the adoption of the international and the 
EU standards in Ukraine varies from 6% to 46% across various sectors. The low-
est level is observed in the sectors characterised by a large amount of international 
standards such as electrical engineering (8%), telecommunications (7%), informa-
tion technologies (6%). Whilst agriculture and food industry have the highest ra-
tios of adoption of international and EU standards (46% and 34% respectively) 
due to the lower amount of international and EU standards for these sectors. Also, 
the speed of the standards reform is correlated with funding: agriculture and food 
industry receive greater funding for standards reform than manufacturing. In addi-
tion, the level of sector’s integration with the CIS countries influence the level of 
adoption of international and EU standards (e.g. for railroad equipment it is only 
8% since railroad transportation services are mostly integrated with the CIS coun-
tries (see the DSSU, Draft Red Paper, 2007).   
In the area of metrology, Ukraine has a large set of national measurement stan-
dards (46 standards of the first level, 54 standards of the second level, 56 etalons) 
available for industrial and legal metrology. According to domestic companies, 
they do not generally need to send any equipment for calibration abroad even 
when if it is destined to the EU or the US (BIZPRO, 2005).   
As of 31 December 2006, 170 Ukrainian conformity assessment bodies includ-
ing 124 testing laboratories and 22 product certification bodies have been accred-
ited by the National Accreditation Agency of Ukraine - the NAAU (NAAU, 
2006). Overall, in Ukraine there are about 1,000 testing laboratories, of which 600 
                                                                                                                           
appliances; boilers; simple pressurized vessels; equipment operating under pressure; lifts; 
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are state-owned, and about 120 certification bodies, state and private (30 of them 
are linked to the DSSU) (BIZPRO, 2005). Also, there are a few international certi-
fication bodies providing services recognized in the EU and other countries. The 
NAAU conducts an active cooperation with the EU and other international and 
CIS accreditation institutions. In December 2004 upon the thorough audit of the 
national accreditation system of Ukraine by the European experts, the National 
Accreditation Agency of Ukraine and the European Accreditation Association 
(EA) concluded an Agreement on Cooperation. Paragraph 10.1 of this Agreement 
provides for the recognition of services and works on conformity assessment. Fol-
lowing the conclusion of this Agreement, in 2005, 28 Ukrainian conformity as-
sessment bodies accredited by the NAAU informed the NAAU that their testing 
protocols and certificates of compliance were recognized during the exportation of 
foodstuffs, construction materials, metallurgical products, agricultural products, 
and chemicals, etc. to the EU and other countries (NAAU, 2006). For Ukrainian 
exporters to the EU testing their goods in the accredited conformity assessment 
bodies, it implies the reduction of their costs due to the lowering or elimination of 
the necessity to pay for repeating costly conformity assessment procedures per-
formed by EU companies. At the same time, it should be noted that the recognition 
of test results and conformity certificates is sometimes selective and depends on 
the type of products exported to the EU. According to Jakubiak et al (2006), as of 
2006 metallurgy companies, for example, usually managed to receive Ukrainian 
certificates that were accepted in the EU, while exporters of chemicals, agricul-
tural and food products, machinery noted that they face problems with Ukrainian 
certificates in the EU which led to duplication of testing and certification efforts.  
Ukraine has committed to negotiate with the EU an Agreement of Conformity 
Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA) and has already se-
lected the priority sectors to be included. The “ACAA Action Plan” agreed in 
2005 targets the ACAA to be in force in EU-Ukraine trade relations since 2011. 
This plan envisages the approximation and implementation of the EU legislation 
in the field of technical regulations, standardization, and conformity assessment 
and the EU sectoral legislation in regard to products covered by the Agreement. 
These products will be able to enter internal market freely, without additional test-
ing and certification. For Ukraine this means improved access to the internal mar-
ket and enhanced competitiveness of domestic products in the EU market. Ukraine 
is also an affiliate member of the ILAC (International Laboratory Accreditation 
Cooperation)
30.  
                                                 
30 Once Ukraine obtains a full-fledged ILAC membership, it will have to abide its rules 
and fulfil the obligations of member bodies (i.e., to accept test results of laboratories ac-
credited with, and notified by, ILAC member bodies). Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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Notwithstanding the above progress, Ukraine’s major problems in the area of 
reforming its technical regulation sphere include inadequate state funding of these 
reforms; weak material base and underdeveloped conformity assessment and me-
trology infrastructure; insufficient number of laboratories technically competent to 
perform internationally recognized tests; resistance to change inside responsible 
government bodies (the DSSU), duplication of supervisory and controlling func-
tions in central agencies of executive power, monopolised state certification bod-
ies, etc. As a result, even in the areas where EU standards have been adopted, con-
formity assessment and certification is not always possible, leading to a rather 
limited mutual recognition of certificates of compliance by countries. This signifi-
cantly restricts the EU-Ukraine trade and raises the costs of Ukrainian producers 
willing to export to the EU.  
 
4.1.2.  Georgia  
 
Georgia has been the WTO member since June 2000. According to the Work-
ing Party Report, Georgia confirmed that from the date of accession all Soviet-era 
“GOST” and other regional standards would be voluntary with respect to products 
imported from WTO members. With respect to the items for which certification 
remained mandatory in Georgia imported products meeting either international, 
European, or GOST standards would be accepted, as well as conformance assess-
ment certificates issued by internationally recognized authorities of the exporting 
countries, or approvals provided by recognized independent conformity assess-
ment bodies. Georgia took the obligation that the existing GOST standards would 
be replaced by voluntary standards or technical regulations based on international 
standards in accordance with a transition plan, with full replacement by May 2002 
(see Georgia WTO Working Party Report). Still, Georgia has been facing difficul-
ties in the implementation of these obligations mainly due to the shortage of finan-
cial and human resources
31. The Law on Standardization was adopted in 1999 and 
it introduced a concept of voluntary standards. Then in 2005 Georgia adopted new 
legislation on standardization, metrology and conformity assessment.  
Though domestic producers are now free to use voluntary standards including 
international standards, GOST standards and their own standards, the GOST stan-
dards are still most frequently applied by them. The National Agency for Stan-
dards, Technical Regulations and Metrology (central executive body) conducts 
registration of international standards as national standards. Up to now, it has al-
ready registered 20,000 GOST standards, 400 ISO standards and ASTM (for pe-
                                                 
31 http://www.mfa.gov.ge/files/55_61_133510_CurrentTradeRegime.pdf. DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 88  39 
troleum products) standards (see Maliszewska et al., 2008a). Adoption of new 
national standards based on EU standards is proceeding very slowly. 
The national legislation stipulates the priority of EU Directives as a base for 
national technical regulations and standards. Still, the process of adoption of na-
tional technical regulations is slow as well. Georgia has already adopted only a 
few EU based technical regulations in the field of transport safety, pesticides and 
agrochemicals, and metrology. 
In early 2006, Georgia recognized mandatory standards and technical regula-
tions being applied worldwide and, in particular, in EU, OECD and CIS countries. 
First of all, this is a significant trade liberalization measure on the import side 
since the importer can choose to conform his products to Georgian standards or the 
standards of any EU or OECD member country. If foreign standards are chosen, 
they must be registered by the importer in the National Agency for Standardiza-
tion, Technical Regulations and Metrology. At the same time, domestic producers 
are now entitled to produce according to EU and OECD member states’ technical 
regulations (once registered by the Agency), as well as according to the CIS 
GOSTs. This potentially creates a scope for the cost reduction for domestic firms 
exporting to the EU, as now they do not need to modify their production to satisfy 
differing domestic and EU technical regulations. Still, so far very few international 
technical regulations has been registered at the Agency suggesting the difficulties 
faced by domestic producers in application of international technical regulations 
(see Maliszewska et al., 2008a). 
Georgia’s metrology infrastructure and measurement standards are rather un-
derdeveloped. As a result, Georgian producers have to use metrological services of 
neighbouring countries, including Ukraine. 
There are about 100 testing laboratories in Georgia that have been accredited in 
such fields as electrical and radio engineering products, food and mineral water, 
oil products, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, etc.
32 However, certificates of com-
pliance issued by Georgian conformity assessment bodies are not recognized by 
the EU since the competent authorities have no means to certify that exports would 
fulfil the importing country requirement. As a result, domestic producers willing 
to export to the EU need to pay for the services of conformity assessment bodies 
based in the EU or other countries, increasing significantly their costs. 
There is also a practice in Georgia that in the majority of cases the importing 
EU companies are responsible for undertaking all necessary tests and implementa-
                                                 
32 U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service And U.S. Department Of State, 2007. Doing 
Business in Georgia: A Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies, available at: 
http://georgia.usembassy.gov/downloads/2007CCGuide.pdf. Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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tion of technical requirements. This also may serve as an illustration that the stan-
dards costs are rather high and burdensome for Georgian producers. 
Taking Ukraine as a benchmark, we can conclude that, on the one hand, Geor-
gia being a WTO member since 2000 has proceeded more than Ukraine in reform-
ing and liberalizing its standardization and technical regulation system (since 
Georgian producers are currently entitled to apply the EU standards and technical 
regulations without duplication of efforts related to compliance with both national 
and the EU standards). On the other hand, Ukraine has achieved more in harmo-
nizing and adopting international and the EU technical regulations and standards, 
collaboration with international and the EU accreditation organizations, as well as 
Ukrainian producers has better access to comparatively more developed confor-
mity assessment and metrology infrastructure and as a result they can avoid or 
reduce additional costs on passing costly calibration, testing, and conformity as-
sessment procedures in other countries. This leads us to assume that the standards 
costs for Georgian exporters to the EU are higher by 30% as compared with 
Ukraine.  
 
4.1.3.  Armenia  
 
Armenia has been the WTO member since 2003. Armenia’s WTO commit-
ments in this area include the obligation to apply the WTO Agreement on Techni-
cal Barriers to Trade from the date of accession without recourse to any transition 
period, and would sign and follow the Code of Good Practice for the preparation, 
adoption and application of standards from the date of Armenia's accession to the 
WTO. Armenia also committed that from the date of accession, it would accept 
conformity assessment certificates issued by internationally recognized authorities 
of exporting countries with which Armenia had signed mutual recognition agree-
ments, or approvals provided by recognized independent conformity assessment 
bodies (see Armenia WTO Working Party Report). Still so far, Armenia has 
agreements on mutual recognition of certificates only with the CIS countries and 
Iran. Also, it has not yet granted unilateral recognition and acceptance of certifi-
cates or approvals. 
In 2004, Armenia adopted a package of laws in the standardization and certifi-
cation sphere, including on standardization, conformity assessment, metrology and 
market surveillance. The Department for Standardization, Metrology and Confor-
mity Assessment (SARM) of the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development, 
responsible for the policy making and legislative functions in this area, has devel-
oped and adopted 320 national standards since 1993, but only 20% of them are 
harmonized with international and EU standards. Still, the majority of the standards DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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applied in Armenia are regional standards. More than 18,000 interstate standards of 
CIS countries (GOST) are included in the national fund of standards. In practice, 
most Armenian producers continue applying obsolete Soviet standards, though 
being voluntary now. 
In accordance with its WTO commitments, after 31 December 2004 all manda-
tory GOST standards in Armenia expired and the system of voluntary standards 
and compulsory technical regulations based on international standards was intro-
duced. For this purpose, Armenia has been actively developing technical regula-
tions to replace existing mandatory standards and to fill in the regulatory gap which 
appeared after mandatory standards have been abolished. As of 2008 Armenia 
adopted 93 technical regulations (50 before the 31 December 2004 and 43 after). 
These technical regulations cover the strategic sectors for the Armenian economy 
such as food industry, tobacco products, electrical equipment, chemical products, 
machinery, etc
33. 
There are no internationally recognized conformity assessment bodies in Ar-
menia; as a result, the EU and other developed countries do not recognise compli-
ance certificates of Armenia, and mutual recognition of certificates between coun-
tries is not likely to happen in the foreseeable future. Testing laboratories usually 
lack modern conformity assessment equipment and competent personnel. The 
accreditation process of conformity assessment bodies does not always imply ade-
quate examination and proper implementation. Armenia applies a modular ap-
proach to conformity assessment in accordance with the New and Global Ap-
proach, still a full compliance with the EU regulations in this regard has not been 
achieved yet. Armenian exporters have to use European testing and certifying 
bodies located in the EU and other countries, which adds considerable expenses 
for them. 
We conclude that Armenia’s quality control infrastructure system, though un-
dergoing comprehensive reforms, is still underdeveloped and weak thus creating a 
significant barrier for EU-Armenia trade and raising the costs for Armenian pro-
ducers willing to export to the EU. Being a WTO member from 2003, Armenia 
has been ahead of Ukraine in reforming its standards and technical regulation sys-
tem and implementing WTO commitments (e.g., in terms of the introduction of 
the system of voluntary standards, adoption of technical regulations, based on 
international standards, etc.). At the same time, underdeveloped conformity as-
sessment infrastructure and the lack of international recognition of conformity 
assessment and accreditation procedures implemented in Armenia makes exports 
to the EU more costly than in case of Ukraine. We may also assume that stan-
                                                 
33 See http://www.sarm.am/?go=commodities. Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
 
CASE Network Reports No. 88  42 
dards’ costs were slightly higher in Armenia as compared to Georgia in 2006 due 
to the recognition by Georgia of mandatory standards and technical regulations 
being applied worldwide and, in particular, in the EU, while Armenian producers 
were likely to incur some additional costs as a result of the regulatory gap between 
adopted domestic mandatory technical regulations and the EU norms. Based on 
the above analysis, we estimate these costs to be higher by 40% for Armenian 
exporters as compared to Ukraine.   
 
4.1.4.  Azerbaijan 
 
Azerbaijan's Working Party was established on 16 July 1997. The first round of 
talks with the WTO took place in June 2002, five years after Azerbaijan was 
granted observer status. Initially, the Azerbaijani leadership opted for a cautious 
and gradual approach: reaffirming in August 2005 the country's commitment to 
achieving WTO membership, President Ilham Aliyev warned that there should be 
no haste. 
In May 2006, government officials declared that out of the 22 new laws that 
needed to be enacted and the 10 that required amendments, only the law on stan-
dardization has been drafted. In August 2006, President Aliyev endorsed a pro-
gram that envisaged completing the process by the end of 2007 with the aim of 
joining the WTO by 2010. 
In 2001, in accordance with Presidential Degree No.623 of 27 December 2001, 
the standardization and certification system became a subject of reform and re-
structuring. The State Agency of Azerbaijan on Standardization, Metrology and 
Patents (AZSTAND) registers national standards, which bear the abbreviation 
“AZS”. However, the regional standards (GOST) adopted by the Interstate Coun-
cil for Standardization and Certification of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) are also used.  
In August 2006, within the fulfilment plan of Azerbaijan’s WTO commit-
ments
34, AZSTAND drafted a law on technical regulation which implies a com-
prehensive change of existing standardization system of product and production 
process, particularly the replacement of compulsory standardization system by a 
voluntary one. 
67 testing laboratories (centres) for products subject to mandatory certification 
have been established in food industry, 23 in petrochemistry, 33 in mechanical 
engineering, 13 in building materials, etc., and have been accredited for technical 
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competence and/or independence under the procedure established by the National 
Certification System AZS. 
Taking into account that Georgia and Armenia have been WTO members since 
2000 and 2003 respectively, and our benchmark – Ukraine – since 2008, and as a 
result these countries have proceeded more in reforming their standardization and 
certification systems, Azerbaijani exporters are most likely facing higher costs of 
compliance for all sectors compared to the other two Caucasian countries, and 
Ukraine. As a result, we assume 50% higher standards costs for Azerbaijani ex-
porters as compared to Ukraine.   
 
4.1.5.  Russia 
 
Russia has applied for the WTO membership in 1993. During the WTO acces-
sion period, Russia has been constantly working to bring its technical regulations 
legislation and policy into conformity with international standards and the WTO 
requirements. In recent year, Russia has moved forward in implementing the stan-
dards reform. The law “On Technical Regulations”, adopted in 2003, opened re-
forms of the existing cumbersome standardization and certification systems in 
Russia and harmonizing them with international standards. The Government set up 
a 7 year transition period for technical regulations reform, during which all manda-
tory requirements must by changed by technical regulations, while standards will 
become voluntary. The Concept of the Development of National Standardization 
System was adopted in 2006 envisaging a gradual movement towards the system 
of voluntary standards based on international and EU standards (still allowing for 
certain exceptions). 
Russian system continues to be based on mandatory rather than voluntary stan-
dards. There are 25,654 Russian national standards including 2,616 for military 
products. According to the estimates by the U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service 
and U.S. Department of State (2005), approximately 35% of Russian national 
standards conform to international standards and norms (as of 2005). The process 
of the development and adoption of technical regulations is very slow (so far, none 
of the developed regulations has been adopted yet). 
Russia still relies on product testing as a key element of the product approval 
process. Many products imported into Russia are required to have a certificate of 
conformity issued by the Federal Agency for Technical Regulation and Metrology. 
Russia does not recognise internationally accepted certified products and under-
takes their testing and mandatory certification in accordance with Russian national 
standards. Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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One of the biggest problems today is the lack of capacity of conformity as-
sessment and accreditation bodies needed to serve the growing demand for their 
services from Russian exporters. Accreditation is implemented by Russian-owned 
and foreign accreditation companies. Still, the accreditation process suffers from 
the application of different procedures and criteria, overlapping fields of activity, 
combination in one body functions of establishment accreditation rules, conduct-
ing of accreditation and certification. As of 1.01.2007, the Federal Agency Regis-
ter of accredited conformity assessment bodies listed 2,581 testing laboratories 
(including 53 foreign laboratories) and 1,124 certification bodies (including 15 
foreign bodies), and 4221 analytical laboratories (FATRM, 2006). Russia is not a 
member of international accreditation organizations such as the EA, IAF, ILAC; 
and there is a lack of international recognition of Russian accreditation system. 
Summing up, the comparison of Russian progress in reforming its standards 
and technical regulations system with Ukraine shows that Ukraine has proceeded a 
bit forward in this regard (in terms of harmonization of national legislation to the 
international and EU standards, adoption of technical regulations, cooperation and 
membership in international accreditation organizations and development and 
recognition of domestic accreditation system, etc.). At the same time, standards 
costs are likely to be lower in Russia than in Armenia, Georgia or Azerbaijan since 
Russian exporters have a better access to more developed standardization, confor-
mity assessment and metrology infrastructure. As a result, we suggest increasing 
the Ukraine benchmark standards costs by 20% to get appropriate assumptions for 
Russian exporters (see Table 4). 
Our assumptions on standards costs faced by domestic producers from the se-
lected CIS countries exporting their products to the EU in 2006 are summarised in 
Table 4. Sectors are grouped in accordance with the NACE industrial classifica-
tion. It should be noted that in many of those sectors the analyzed countries do not 
have any exports to the EU (specifically, exports of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Ar-
menia are highly concentrated in some commodity groups such as oil products, 
non-energy mineral products, base and precious metals, chemicals, etc.). This can 
be explained by the fact that these countries do not produce particular commodi-
ties at all or that the barriers to exports to the EU (such as technical barriers, SPS 
measures, transport costs, etc.) are too high, or that these products are uncompeti-
tive on the EU market. However, in all those cases the assumptions on NTBs need 
to be provided, so we rely on the Ukrainian data. Since our CGE modelling exer-
cise requires also the same standards costs assumptions for 2004, we assume that 
standards costs faced by exporters to the EU in 2004 were 10% higher than those 
in 2006 (the main argument here is that all CIS countries have been gradually re-
forming and liberalising their standards and technical regulations systems as part 
of their WTO and PCA commitments). DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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Legal, regulatory and institutional harmonization in the area of standards and 
technical regulation system between CIS countries and the EU (including the im-
plementation of the EU acquis, conclusion of the Agreement of Conformity As-
sessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA), the conclusion of mem-
bership and cooperation agreements with the European and international bodies, 
etc.) are expected to ensure better access to cheaper conformity assessment proce-
dures as well as introduction of mutual recognition agreements between CIS coun-
tries and the EU in key sectors, thus considerably reducing existing standardisation 
costs and improving CIS countries access to the EU internal market. We assume 
that in the medium-term perspective such harmonization may bring all selected 
CIS countries up to a 50% reduction of their standards costs in trade with the EU 
(provided the same speed of reforms by each country, but with preserving their 
relative positions). Full harmonisation of domestic legislation and institutions and 
development of fully operational and the EU compatible quality assurance infra-
structure is considered to be attainable in the long-term perspective only. 
In regard to trade between CIS countries, we assume zero standards costs for 
exporters supplying their products to CIS markets since the majority of standards 
and mandatory technical regulations applied in CIS countries are still based on 
interstate (GOST) standards. CIS countries are signatories of the Agreement on 
Mutual Policies in the Area of Standards, Metrology and Certification (signed in 
1992 and amended in 2000) that provided for the establishment of the Interstate 
Council on Standards, Metrology and Certifications and for mutual recognition of 
conformity certificates between CIS countries. At the same time, it should be 
noted that in practice these costs are not always zero, since mutual recognition is 
applied only to interstate standards, whilst each country may develop and adopt its 
own national standards thus creating risks for exporters. Moreover, certificates 
issued by the partner country can be questioned by some other countries, they may 
require certificates to be issued by their own bodies (including conducting the 
testing procedures). (BIZPRO, 2005). Still, these practices are not so widespread, 
hence the zero standards costs assumptions between CIS countries seems sensible. 
The Interstate Council, which is to develop the system of harmonised standards 
between CIS countries, also conducts the harmonisation of interstate standards 
with ISO standards, European and international standards, which then are adopted 
by CIS countries, though this harmonisation proceeds rather slow (only 20% of 
interstate standards are harmonised with international standards). Provided the 
Interstate Council continues and intensifies these efforts, we can assume that the 
process of standards and technical regulations harmonisation with European and 
international ones undertaken by individual countries on the national level will not 
eventually lead to creation of barriers in trade between CIS countries (hence, zero 
standards costs between CIS countries upon harmonization). Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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Table 4. Percentage of yearly production costs spent by exporters to the EU in 2006 in 











    -  20% 30% 40% 50% 
01  Agriculture, hunting and 
related service activities  14.0  16.8 18.2 19.6 21.0 
02  Forestry, logging and related 
service activities  7.0  8.4 9.1 9.8  10.5 
14  Other mining and quarrying  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
15  Manufacture of food products 
and beverages  10.4  12.5 13.5 14.6 15.6 
16  Manufacture of tobacco 
products  n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a 
17 Manufacture  of  textiles  2.3  2.8 3.0 3.2 3.5 
18  Manufacture of wearing appa-
rel; dressing and dyeing of fur  34.4  41.3 44.7 48.2 51.6 
19 
Tanning and dressing of 
leather; manufacture of lug-
gage, and footwear 
5.3  6.4 6.9 7.4 8.0 
20  Manufacture of wood and of 
products of wood and cork  20.9  25.1 27.2 29.3 31.4 
21  Manufacture of pulp, paper 
and paper products  15.0  18.0 19.5 21.0 22.5 
22  Publishing, printing and re-
production of recorded media 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
23 
Manufacture of coke, refined 
petroleum products and nu-
clear fuel 
10.0 12.0  13..0  14.0  15.0 
24  Manufacture of chemicals 
and chemical products  5.5  6.6 7.2 7.7 8.3 
25  Manufacture of rubber and 
plastic products  5.6  6.7 7.3 7.8 8.4 
26  Manufacture of other non-
metallic mineral products  29.3  35.2 38.1 41.0 44.0 
27 Manufacture  of  basic  metals  5.0  6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 
28 
Manufacture of fabricated 
metal products, except ma-
chinery and equipment 
6.4  7.7 8.3 9.0 9.6 
29  Manufacture of machinery 
and equipment n.e.c.  4.4  5.3 5.7 6.2 6.6 
30  Manufacture of office ma-
chinery and computers  n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a 
31  Manufacture of electrical ma-
chinery and apparatus n.e.c.  11.0  13.2 14.3 15.4 16.5 DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
 












Manufacture of radio, televi-
sion and communication 
equipment and apparatus 
10.0  12.0 13.0 14.0 15.0 
33 
Manufacture of medical, pre-
cision and optical instru-
ments, watches and clocks 
20.0  24.0 26.0 28.0 30.0 
34  Manufacture of motor vehic-
les, trailers and semi-trailers  12.3  14.8 16.0 17.2 18.5 
35  Manufacture of other trans-
port equipment  4.0  4.8 5.2 5.6 6.0 
36  Manufacture of furniture; 
manufacturing n.e.c.  15.3  18.4 19.9 21.4 23.0 
37 Recycling  5.5  6.6 7.2 7.7 8.3 
  Total/average  13.9  16.7 18.1 19.5 20.9 
Source: own assumptions based on the survey described in Jakubiak et al (2006). 
 
 
4.2.  Border costs  
 
Customs and administrative procedures have substantial impacts on trade 
flows. Evidence and research studies show that countries that have efficient cus-
toms, good transport networks and fewer document requirements, all ensuring 
faster and cheaper compliance with export and import procedures, are more com-
petitive globally (WB, Doing Business in 2006). That leads to more exports and 
thus to greater economic growth. Conversely, too complicated and burdensome 
customs and administrative procedures are usually associated with more corrup-
tion in customs. Long delays, expensive procedures and frequent demands for 
bribes significantly restrict trade. Also, traders may try to avoid customs proce-
dures and smuggle goods across the border, as a result, the very purpose in having 
border control of trade – to levy taxes and ensure high quality of goods – is de-
feated (WB, Doing Business in 2006). 
In the CGE exercise border costs are modelled as additional purchases of a 
domestic transportation good, which includes shipping, handling and warehousing 
for customs purchases. Border costs for the selected CIS countries are also based 
on the Jakubiak et al (2006) study which provides the costs of customs clearance 
faced by the Ukrainian exporters to the EU in 2006. According to the claims of 
Ukrainian exporters to the EU, their border costs amounted on average to 7% of 
the value of production in 2006. In order to develop assumptions on border costs Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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for other selected CIS countries in 2006 and 2004 we refer to the “Cost of Doing 
Business”, the World Bank reports, which allow for the comparison of those costs 
across time and across countries and record every official procedure – and the 
associated documents, time and cost – for importing and exporting the goods, 
starting with the contractual agreement between the two parties and ending with 
delivery of the goods. According to these data, in 2004 the cost of export and im-
port was about 30% higher in Georgia than in Ukraine, and by 2.6 times higher in 
Azerbaijan than in Ukraine (see Table 5). WB data also show an important im-
provement in the import and export procedures in Georgia and Armenia over 
2004–2006 period, while Ukraine, Russia and Azerbaijan have shown no im-
provements over the past few years. Our assumptions on border costs in Ukraine 
and other CIS countries in 2004 and 2006 are presented in Table 6. 
We assume that border costs faced by exporters from CIS countries will be re-
duced by 50% in the case of legal approximation and regulatory convergence with 
the EU standards. We assume that the reduction of border costs due to reform of 
customs procedures is equal in case of trade with other CIS countries and the 
ROW (Rest of the World).  
 
Table 5. Border costs in Ukraine and other CIS countries in 2004 and 2006 
Ukraine Georgia  Armenia  Russia Azerbaijan   









































































































































Note. The reports for 2006 and 2008 cover data for Jan 2005 and Jan 2007 used to repre-
sent here the status quo in 2004 and 2006.  
*Numbers in parenthesises are countries’ to Ukraine ratios for a specific year.  
** Cost measures the fees levied on a 20-foot container in U.S. dollars. All the fees associ-
ated with completing the procedures to export or import the goods are included, such as costs 
for documents, administrative fees for customs clearance and technical control, terminal han-
dling charges and inland transport. The cost measure does not include tariffs or trade taxes. 
Source: WB Costs of Doing Business reports 2006 and 2008.  DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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Table 6. Assumptions on border costs in Ukraine and other CIS countries in 2004 and 
2006 (in% of export value) 
Ukraine Georgia  Armenia  Russia  Azerbaijan   


















7  7  9.1  7.7 10.5 8.8 13.3  13.3  18.2  18.2 
Note: Estimates for Ukraine are from Jakubiak et al (2006), adjustments are based on Do-
ing Business 2006 and 2008.  




4.3.  Services  
 
Availability of a diverse set of business services is important for economic 
growth since it allows domestic firms to purchase a quality adjusted unit of busi-
ness services at lower cost (Rutherford and Tarr, 2006). Reduction or elimination 
of the barriers to foreign direct investment in services sectors will improve access 
of domestic firms to high-quality services in areas like telecommunication, bank-
ing, insurance, transportation and other business services that typically lead to the 
reduction of cost of doing business, increase productivity, and improve the com-
petitiveness of inidividual economies (Rutherford and Tarr, 2006). 
In line with the WTO negotiations and international commitments, CIS coun-
tries liberalize market access for foreign service providers and encourage them to 
increase foreign direct investment. WTO-related reforms in services sectors imply 
the elimination or substantial reduction of discriminatory measures and barriers 
faced by foreign service providers (such as statutory fund restrictions for foreign 
investors, restrictions or prohibitions to supply particular services and to establish 
of branches of foreign companies, restrictions on movement of foreign employees, 
etc.). Regulatory convergence with the EU aquis and closer integration between 
countries will likely further reduce barriers to trade in services between CIS coun-
tries and the EU, including the cross border supply, commercial presence (through 
FDI), movement of natural persons. Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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Existing barriers to trade in business services in Ukraine and Russia were most 
recently estimated by Copenhagen Economics, IER and OEI (2005) and Kimura et 
al (2004a, 2004b, 2004c). The authors used the same methodology implying the 
assessments of the regulatory environment in Ukraine and Russia through the im-
plementation of business surveys and other information sources and converting 
these into an index of restrictiveness in telecommunication, financial sector and 
transport sectors
35, and, after that, estimation of the ad valorem equivalents of the 
existing restrictions. It should be noted that distinctions were made between barri-
ers faced specifically by foreign investors vs. restrictions incurred by both foreign 
providers and domestic firms, through the separate calculations of foreign dis-
criminatory restrictiveness index (applicable only to foreign suppliers) and overall 
foreign restrictiveness index (applicable to both foreign and domestic producers). 
The authors assumed that discriminatory barriers faced by foreign suppliers will be 
substantially reduced or eliminated upon accession to the WTO and full imple-
mentation of WTO requirements by CIS countries. 
One should also note that the described tariff equivalents assess restrictiveness 
of regulatory environment affecting trade in services and FDI in services sectors 
across countries rather than overall investment environment which also includes 
political risks, infrastructural development, institutional capacities, corruption, etc. 
To develop assumptions on barriers to FDI in services for Georgia, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan we use Ukraine’s estimates from Copenhagen Economics, IER and 
OEI (2005). Ukraine’s assumptions are then adjusted for each country taken into 
account i) the status of the WTO accession/membership of those CIS countries 
since WTO accession implies substantial reduction of discriminatory regulatory 
measures against barriers to trade in services. The longer accession/membership in 
the WTO, the lower level of discriminatory barriers to FDI in services is. ii) the 
values of Heritage Foundation economic freedom indices (Global economic free-
dom index which covers 10 freedoms in 161 countries
36 including Investment 
freedom index and Financial freedom index), compatible across countries and 
measures (see Table 7). 
 
                                                 
35 For Ukraine – railway transportation services, for Russia – air and maritime transporta-
tion services. 
36 Each one of the 10 freedoms (business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, govern-
ment size, monetary freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights, 
freedom from corruption, and labor freedom) is graded using a scale from 0 to 100, where 
100 represents the maximum freedom. A score of 100 signifies an economic environment 
or set of policies that is most conducive to economic freedom, an absolute right of property 
ownership, fully realized freedoms of movement for labor, capital, goods and services. DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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Table 7. Index of economic freedom, 2008 







freedom  WTO accession status 
Ukraine 133  51.1%  30%  50% Member  since  2008 
Armenia 28 70.3%  70%  70%  Member  since  2003 
Georgia   32  69.2%  70%  60%  Member since 2000 
Russia   134  49.9%  30%  40% 
In accession process 
since 1993, final stage 
of accession 
Azerbaijan 107  55.3%  30%  30%  In accession process 
since 1997 
Note. Distribution of Global Economic Freedom: 80–100 – free; 70–79.9 – mostly free; 
60–69.9 – moderately free; 50–59.9 – mostly unfree; 0–49.9 – repressed. 
Source: The Heritage Foundation, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/countries.cfm. 
 
Table 8. Assumptions on barriers to trade in services (ad-valorem tariff equivalents 
of barriers to trade in services), 2006 








Ukraine   16.0%  6.0%  24.0% 
Russia      24.0%*  10.0%  41.0% 
Georgia  -35% off Ukraine’s 
estimates  10.4% 3.9%  15.6% 
Armenia  -25% to Ukraine’s 
estimates  12.0% 4.5%  18.0% 
Azerbaijan  +30% to Ukraine’s 
estimates  20.8% 7.8%  31.2% 
Note. * - own assumption (calculated as Ukraine’s appropriate estimate increased by 50%). 
Sources: Kimura et al (2004a, 2004b, 2004c) – for Russia (except railway transportation); 
Copenhagen Economics, Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Institute for 
East European Studies Munich, (2005) for Ukraine; own assumptions – for other countries. 
 
In particular, Heritage Foundation indices indicate a high degree of economic 
freedom (including investment and financial freedom) in Georgia and Armenia, 
while a repressed investment environment is reported in Ukraine, Russia and 
Azerbaijan
37. Also Georgia and Armenia have been members of the WTO since 
2000 and 2003 respectively, followed by Ukraine, while Russian Federation and 
Azerbaijan are still at the accession stage (see Table 7). Taking these considera-
                                                 
37 It should be noted that the Heritage Foundation investment and financial freedom indices 
capture not only formal regulatory restrictions affecting FDI in CIS countries but also 
corruption issues, contract enforcement, implementation of laws, etc. Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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tions into account, we can roughly assume the following ranking of the countries 
in regard to the level of barriers to FDI in services (from lowest to highest): Geor-
gia, Armenia, Ukraine, Russia, and Azerbaijan. Our final assumptions on barriers 
to trade in services across five CIS countries under consideration in 2006 are rep-
resented in Table 8. 
The harmonization of national legislation and policies with the EU acquis will 
lead to a further reduction of barriers to FDI for both foreign and domestic service 
suppliers. We assume a 50% reduction down from the 2006 level of barriers to 
FDI in each country as a result of harmonization with the EU acquis. DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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5. CGE Estimates of the Impact of 
Improved Market Access for  
Selected European Neighbour-
hood Policy Countries 
The aim of this section is to look at the impact of institutional harmonization of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy countries with the EU, using a CGE model.  
We focus on three pillars of trade facilitation i.e. legislative and regulatory ap-
proximation, reform of customs rules and liberalization of the access of foreign 
providers of services. The modelling exercise covers five selected ENP countries 
(CIS5) i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and Russia. The choice of 
countries was mainly determined by the data availability. 
 
 
5.1.  The CGE model 
 
We employ a standard static computable general equilibrium model. It includes 
several price-wedge distortions such as factor taxes in production, taxes on interme-
diate inputs, subsidies in production, value-added taxes, import tariffs and export 
subsidies. Production involves combination of intermediate inputs and primary fac-
tors (capital, skilled and unskilled labour, energy products). We assume a Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function over primary factors and a Leontief pro-
duction function combining intermediate inputs with factors of production compos-
ite. Primary factors are mobile across sectors within a region, but immobile interna-
tionally. Each region has a government and a single representative consumer. 
Demand for final goods arises from a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Within 
each region, final and intermediate demands are composed of the same Armington 
aggregate of domestic and imported varieties. The composite supply is a nested 
CES function, where consumers first allocate their expenditures among domestic 
and imported varieties and then choose among imported varieties. In the imperfect 
competition case firm varieties enter at the bottom of the CES function. This ap-Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
 
CASE Network Reports No. 88  54 
proach allows for the differentiation in preferences for home and imported goods. 
The special form of this demand structure is firm level product differentiation. It 
requires the assumption that all elasticities of substitution between firms and prod-
ucts are equal. Demand is then represented by a single level CES function with all 
domestic and imported varieties competing directly. 
There is strong empirical evidence for modelling selected sectors as imper-
fectly competitive (e.g. Pratten, 1988). Increasing returns to scale (IRS) in produc-
tion will therefore be incorporated in selected manufacturing industries. Goods 
subject to constant returns to scale (CRS) such as agriculture, forestry or public 
services are differentiated by the country of origin. Products can either be sold at 
the domestic market or exported depending on relative prices and constant elastic-
ity of transformation production function. In sectors subject to IRS, goods are 
differentiated at the level of firms. Firms set prices at the level where marginal 
cost is equal to marginal revenue. There is free entry, which drives profits to zero. 
We will make an assumption of large group monopolistic competition with con-
stant mark-up over marginal costs. 
A detailed description of the model equations, calibration and parameters em-
ployed is provided in the Annex 2. It is built on the basis of the MRT – Multire-
gional Trade Model – by Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1996) implemented in 
their evaluation of the impact of the completion of the Single Market, but has been 
modified in several ways to fit this analysis. Similar analysis has been recently 
applied in the feasibility studies for Georgia and Armenia (Maliszewska et al.., 
2008a, 2008b) and Russia (Dabrowski, Emerson, Maliszewska Eds., 2007) and 
Ukraine by Ecorys and CASE-Ukraine (2007) and earlier in the analysis of the 
Eastern EU Enlargement (Maliszewska, 2004) and Albanian Integration with the 
EU (Maliszewska and Kolesnichenko, 2004). 
 
 
5.2.  Data 
 
A social accounting matrix (SAM) for Georgia for 2004 was based on Jasper 
Jensen’s and David Tarr’s submission to the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Pro-
ject) data base
38. The SAM for Ukraine was submitted to GTAP by CASE-
Ukraine. The data for all other regions is based on GTAP7 pre-release 3 data base. 
                                                 
38 The submission of the SAMs for Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan by Jaspers Jensen 
and David Tarr was part of the ENEPO project coordinated by CASE and financed by the 
European Commission (FP6 STREP).  DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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The GTAP database includes the national and regional input-output structures, 
bilateral trade flows, final demand pattern and government intervention bench-
marked to 2004. The Georgian SAM has been imposed on the GTAP data using a 
code developed by Thomas Rutherford (www.mpsge.com/gtap6)
39. The bench-
mark data includes Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Ukraine, and remaining 
CIS countries, EU27, Turkey and the Rest of the World (ROW). It includes 33 
sectors out of which 11 are subject to increasing returns to scale (IRTS) in the 
imperfect competition scenarios
40. 
We apply the CGE model to create a benchmark and then to study the implica-
tions of the trade liberalisation that took place between 2004 and 2006, a Simple 
FTA and a Deep FTA. The Deep FTA will be within a framework of a trade 
agreement that is bound to include across the board lowering or elimination of 
tariffs. Before studying the implications of various versions of an FTA we need to 
study the effects of trade liberalisation that took place over 2004–2006 period. The 
changes due to tariff and other trade related policies are already taking place and 
will require between 5–10 years to take their full impact on the economies. With-
out modelling of these policy changes we would be wrongly attributing their im-
pact to the implications of FTAs. The Simple FTA scenario involves scrapping 
the tariffs in the EU27-ENP countries trade with the exception of agricultural and 
food products where tariffs are only halved. A Deep FTA adds the liberalization of 
non-tariff barriers to the Simple FTA. The three types of NTBs taken into account 
in this study are border costs, standards costs and barriers to foreign provision of 
services. The review of NTBs in the five selected ENP countries and the exact 
assumptions used in all scenarios are discussed in the Section 3.3. 
 
 
5.3.  Tariffs  
 
The data on tariffs in the baseline 2004 and 2006 or 2007 originates from the 
WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution) database. It includes applied trade 
                                                 
39 The original SAM for Georgia was not introduced correctly into the pre-release GTAP 
data, which is still in the testing stage. The Armenian and Azeri data submitted along with 
the Georgian data used in the present study was introduced properly. Other adjustments 
have been made to the GTAP data to update tariff data to 2004 levels. 
40 These are food, beverages and tobacco; textiles and wearing apparel; leather; paper 
products, publishing; petroleum and coal products; chemical products, rubber, plastic; 
mineral products, metal and metal products;  transport equipment; machinery and equip-
ment; other manufacturing products. Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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weighted averages of tariff rates with respect to all regions. In most instances, the 
GTAP tariff data for 2004 was replaced with the WITS tariffs for 2004 which 
were much lower. The data on tariffs for the set of simulations representing the 
initial trade policy changes for Georgia, Armenia and Ukraine is from 2006; data 
for Russia and Azerbaijan is from 2007. 
 
Table 9. Tariffs on imports from the EU27 and the rest of the world (ROW) in 2006 






2006  Russia 2007  Ukraine 
2006   





3.0 3.1 6.5  10.2 6.3 3.7 3.2 5.5 3.8 5.2 
Livestock 2.5  0.2  5.5  11.1 4.4  11.6 4.1  6.3  0.6  0.6 
Forestry  0.3 2.9 6.7  12.7 0.0 0.0  10.5  12.5 1.1 5.6 
Fishing  1.1 0.3 1.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 8.5 9.7 1.0 0.7 
Coal  0.0 0.0 0.3    0.0 0.0 4.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 
Oil               3.8  5.0  0.0  2.0 
Gas   0.0  8.0  15.0 0.0  0.0  5.0  0.0  
Mining and 









5.2 7.1  12.5  14.5 0.0 0.0 9.2  12.3 7.4 7.1 
Leather 
products  5.6 9.7  10.9  14.7 0.0 0.0 6.8 8.0 9.0 7.0 
Wood 
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2006  Russia 2007  Ukraine 
2006   




0.1 0.0 6.4 8.7 0.0 0.0 9.2 9.9 2.1 1.9 
Transport 




1.8 0.8 5.3 5.8 0.0 0.0 5.8 6.1 2.8 2.6 
Manufac-
tures nec  6.3 2.7  12.9  13.9 0.0 0.0  14.1  15.0 5.3 5.5 
Source: WITS and own calculations. 
 
Georgia has the most liberal trade regime with most goods from the EU enter-
ing the Georgian market duty free. This is followed by Armenia and Ukraine. The 
highest protection is recorded in Russia and Azerbaijan. The expectation therefore 
is that the Simple FTA will be most beneficial to these two countries as most 
benefits often stem from own trade liberalization. The other major factor is the 
amount of trade with the EU. Further lowering of tariffs with respect to the rest of 
the world is expected with the WTO accession of Ukraine (which became a WTO 
member in 2008) and in the future in the case of Russia and Azerbaijan, which are 
negotiating their memberships in the WTO. 
In terms of their access to the EU market most goods exported from the CIS5
41 
qualify for the EU Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). In addition, in 2006 
Georgia has qualified for the special arrangement for sustainable development and 
good governance (GSP+) offering it a particularly advantageous access to the EU 
market facing zero duties on all its exports to the EU. Also access of Armenian 
goods to the EU market is almost duty free with the exception of low tariffs on 
Food products and Textiles. As of January 2009 Armenia and Azerbaijan have 
also been granted the GSP+ status. 
 
Table 10. Tariffs on exports to the EU27 in 2004 according to the sectors of the CGE 
model 
   Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia  Russia  Ukraine 
Grains, fruits, vegetables, 
crops nec  1.4 0.5  0.1  5.9  11.6 
Livestock 0.3  NA  0.0  0.9  0.0 
Forestry 9.3  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.0 
Fishing 10.4  NA  5.4  6.0  0.0 
                                                 
41 I.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine.  Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
 
CASE Network Reports No. 88  58 
   Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia  Russia  Ukraine 
Coal NA  NA  4.7  0.0  0.0 
Oil   NA  NA  0.4  0.0  0.0 
Gas NA  NA  NA  0.0  3.4 
Mining and quarrying  0.2  0.0  0.4  0.0  5.4 
Food products, beverages 
and tobacco  9.0 11.0 9.5 8.0 0.0 
Textiles and textile goods  6.1  5.8  8.9  6.8  0.0 
Leather products  0.9  2.9  4.7  3.5  0.0 
Wood products  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.0 
Paper products, publishing  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0 
Petroleum, coal products  4.5  0.0  3.5  0.0  0.0 
Chemical, rubber, plastic 
products  2.5 0.5  2.4  0.7  3.1 
Mineral products nec  1.6  2.7  1.1  1.0  0.0 
Metals and metal products  0.8  0.9  2.1  0.8  0.0 
Transport equipment  1.2  0.0  1.7  0.9  0.0 
Machinery and electronic 
equipment  0.5 0.1  0.1  0.2  0.0 
Manufactures nec  0.0  0.5  4.2  0.3  0.0 
Source: WITS and own calculations. 
 
 
5.4.  Non-tariff barriers 
 
One of the studies ordered by the European Commission before completion of 
the Single Market looked at the perception of EC producers as to the importance 
of barriers to be removed by the formation of the Single Market. It showed that the 
elimination of physical frontiers, costs and delays, harmonisation of national stan-
dards and regulations, and government procurement were the most important bar-
riers to trade before 1992. Similar conclusions were reached after a survey of bar-
riers to exports to the EU faced by the Ukrainian exporters (see Jakubiak et. al. 
2006). Elimination or lessening of these impediments to trade will also likely 
bring major benefits to the ENP countries especially if they gain improved access 
to the Single Market thanks to the creation of a deep FTA covering NTBs. In 
modelling of a deep FTA we focus on a reduction in border costs and delays, as 
well as a reduction in costs of compliance with varying national standards and 
technical regulations. In addition we also study the impact of a reduction of barri-
ers to foreign provision of selected services. 
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5.4.1.  Border costs 
 
One of the most observable barriers to trade is due to the existence of borders 
and customs formalities, which involve delays and various kinds of administrative 
costs. At the moment all goods from the ENP countries exported to the EU and 
vice versa are stopped at the EU border for customs clearance. In the CGE exer-
cise border costs are modelled as additional purchases of a domestic transportation 
good, which includes shipping, handling and warehousing for customs purchases. 
For the purpose of the CGE modelling, it is assumed that benchmark border 
costs in Georgia are roughly 30% higher than those for Ukraine, in Armenia – 
50% higher, in Russia – 90% higher and in Azerbaijan – 260% higher. This is 
based on the discussion in Section 3.3 and comparison of border costs per ship-
ment from Table 3. Ukrainian border costs are approximated by the costs of cus-
toms clearance faced by the Ukrainian exporters to the EU in 2006 (Jakubiak et al 
2006). These costs amounted on average to 7% of the value of exports, hence e.g. 
the 2004 benchmark border costs in Georgia are assumed to be equal to 9.1% of 
the value of exports. In 2006 these costs go down by 20% in Georgia and by 25% 
in Armenia again based on the comparison of the cost of shipment in Table 5. The 
2006 border costs in the remaining countries remain unchanged again in agree-
ment with the “Cost of Doing Business” estimates. The Simple FTA is assumed to 
leave those costs unchanged. The argument behind this is that already the majority 
of industrial tariffs in trade with the EU have been eliminated; hence the additional 
elimination of red tape or corruption as a result of complete elimination of tariffs 
on industrial products is likely to be quite small. In a Deep FTA these costs are 
assumed to be reduced by 50%, which is assumed to reflect a long-term improve-
ment in customs and transit procedures. 
 
5.4.2.  Standards costs 
 
The EC has been concerned with the elimination of the technical barriers to 
trade since its creation. However, the major effort of elimination of barriers to 
trade imposed by differing national regulations and standards was undertaken with 
the creation of the Single Market. The Single Market measures consist of 2,556 
different mandated standards. This number rises to more than 20,000 when volun-
tary standards are considered. 
The differences in technical regulations and standards, which vary between 
domestic and the EU markets, require producers to manufacture or package goods 
in forms, which are different than for their domestic markets. Standards costs 
therefore increase the cost of production for exports and they are modelled as addi-Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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tional value added in each sector where trade takes place. This approach ignores 
the fixed cost elements of implementation of new standards. However, these are 
mostly one-off investments and their magnitude is very difficult to estimate as 
these investments are often undertaken as part of the greater modernization effort. 
In the survey mentioned above, CASE and CASE-UA investigated NTBs faced 
by Ukrainian exporters to the EU (Jakubiak et al 2006). Among others, respon-
dents (over 500 companies) were asked to assess costs associated with meeting EU 
technical regulations and the duplication of efforts related to compliance with both 
national and EU standards (existing for the majority of surveyed firms). Given that 
we were not able to obtain data on standards costs for all selected ENP countries 
we are relying on the Ukrainian estimates as discussed in Section 4.1. 
The reasons why we expect the costs of compliance with technical regulations 
to decrease following a deep FTA are greater availability of conformity assess-
ment centres in the ENP countries, which would result in lower costs of testing 
and compliance, better availability of information and greater cooperation between 
the EU and ENP countries firms that comes with increased integration. Hence we 
make a rough assumption that the standards costs decrease by 50% in a Deep 
FTA. The experience of the new EU members and EU firms following the forma-
tion of the Single Market indicates that these costs have indeed gone down. 
Our assumptions so far applied to CIS5 exports to the EU. We do not know of 
similar estimates for other export destinations for the CIS5 products and in any 
case the impact of a Deep FTA on the costs of complying with regulations of other 
importing partners is not clear. Hence in the simulations we assume that these 
costs apply only to exports to the EU. Any harmonization of legislation with the 
EU, wider availability of conformity assessment centres and with that lower costs 
of certification that would follow a Deep FTA would lead to a reduction of these 
costs for the CIS5 exporters to the EU. On the other hand, for CIS5 firms which 
have been producing only for domestic market, the introduction of EU regulations 
as compulsory on the domestic market may impose additional investment/ costs. A 
certain part of this investment will be undertaken in the normal course of replacing 
existing equipment over the coming years. However, in some cases the costs of 
compliance may be significant. Nevertheless even those firms are likely to benefit 
from the ability to export to the enlarged EU and wider availability of the assess-
ment centres. Overall, it seems likely that all firms will experience some reduction 
in standards costs.  
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5.4.3.  Barriers to trade in services 
 
We were not able to find surveys on the barriers to trade in services for three 
out the CIS5. To the best of our knowledge, such estimates exist only for Russia 
and Ukraine. Hence again we rely on data for Ukraine. We base our estimates on 
the barriers to foreign direct investment in services estimated by Pavel et. al. 
(2006). The authors estimate tariff equivalents of barriers that discriminate against 
foreign providers of telecommunication, transport and financial services. We 
model those barriers as additional purchases of value added in the amount equal to 
tariff equivalents by exporters or providers of those services from all regions. 
Hence for instance in the case of Georgia we assume that in order to provide fi-
nancial services (banking, insurance) foreign companies face costs higher by 
28.8% compared to local provides. The additional costs in transport sector amount 
to 11.7% and in communications to 3.2%. The assumptions for all countries have 
been discussed in detail in Section 4.3.  
We assume that in a Deep FTA those barriers would be halved. To some extent 
the barriers to foreign provision of services in the case of non-WTO members will 
be reduced with the WTO accession. The estimates for Russia and Ukraine suggest 
that these reductions might be quite significant. However, it is very difficult to esti-
mate to what extent the institutional harmonization with the EU and to what extent 
the changes in legal and business environment brought about by the WTO accession 
will affect those barriers. Hence we opt for an arbitrary assumption of a 50% reduc-
tion in case of a Deep FTA as an illustrative example of the likely implications of a 
significant improvement in legal and business environment. The above discussion of 
modelling assumptions has been summarized in the Table 11 below. 
 
Table 11. Summary of modelling assumptions 
  Benchmark 
2004 
Initial liberaliza-
tion 2006  Simple FTA  Deep FTA 
Tariffs 2006  tariffs 
Zero tariffs in trade 
in industrial prod-
ucts, 50% off tar-
iffs on agricultural 
and food products  
Zero tariffs in trade 
in industrial prod-
ucts, 50% off tar-
iffs on agricultural 
and food products  
Border 
costs 
2004 level (except 
for Georgia and 
Armenia) 
2004 level (except 
for Georgia and 
Armenia) 
50% off 2004 level 
Standards 







2004 level  2004 level  50% off 2004 level Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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5.5.  CGE Simulations 
 
5.5.1.  Benchmark Scenario and Simple FTAs 
 
The macroeconomic implications of the benchmark scenario – 2006 are dis-
played in Table A3 in the Annex 3. In each simulation we calculate the impact of a 
given trade policy change assuming increasing returns to scale in selected sectors 
and allowing for the adjustment of capital stock in response to a change in return 
to capital – the long run scenarios. The calculation of steady state growth effects 
follows Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1996). In the short run scenarios the price 
of capital would be allowed to vary within each country, while capital stock would 
be held constant. In the steady state scenario capital stock is allowed to adjust, 
while the price of capital is held constant at its benchmark level. This approach 
assumes that there exists an invariant capital stock equilibrium. It is defined as a 
set of prices, production and investment levels for which the economy is able to 
grow at a steady rate with constant relative prices. 
This approach provides an upper bound of the potential welfare gains as it ig-
nores the adjustment costs and foregone consumption necessary to increase in-
vestment. For sufficiently high discount rates the costs of forgone consumption 
could overturn the benefits of capital accumulation. Although we measure welfare 
as equivalent variation as a share of GDP, it has to be born in mind that incorpora-
tion of the cost of the investment required to build up the capital stock may sub-
stantially reduce the estimates of welfare gains cited below. On the other hand, our 
approach does not incorporate the potential gains due to productivity improve-
ments or endogenous growth theory “learning by doing” effects. 
Table A3 displays major results of the 2006 scenario. Apart from welfare 
changes (equivalent variation as a share of GDP), we also present changes in 
wages of skilled and unskilled workers and GDP growth. We do not discuss this 
scenario in detail as this is only a benchmark for further analysis, but it is worth-
while noting that a significant own liberalization by Georgia in 2006 has been 
estimated to lead in the long run to an additional 1% growth of GDP. As expected 
the gains are lower in the case of Armenia, as the liberalization between 2004 and 
2006 has been limited. 
In Annex 3 Tables A4-A5 present the impact of Simple FTAs. The impact on 
individual countries depends both on the level of initial barriers and on their inten-
sity to trade with the EU. The countries that gain the most from the Simple FTA 
are Ukraine, Russia and Azerbaijan. Both Georgia and Armenia have already very 
low barriers to trade with the EU, hence their elimination does not stimulate much 
new trade and welfare gains. In terms of the impact on the EU, it is also marginal. DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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This is explained by the very low share of EU trade being directed to/from the CIS 
countries, with only Russia and Ukraine accounting for a non-negligible share of 
total EU27 exports and imports (roughly 4% in the case of Russia and 1% in the 
case of Ukraine) – see Tables 12 and 13 below. 
 










key  EU27 CIS ROW 
Russia    5.90 0.18 0.57 0.15 2.96  43.30  3.73  43.21 
Ukraine 17.99    0.22 0.67 0.37 5.26  32.64  3.24  39.61 
Armenia 9.13 1.36    0.05 2.46 0.21  38.54  0.43  47.82 
Azerbai-
jan  8.15  0.36  0.00  2.72  3.86  52.24  8.46  24.21 
Georgia 14.13 3.33 15.21 3.69    16.77  18.25  13.37  15.25 
Turkey  2.43 0.71 0.05 0.46 0.21    59.98  1.00  35.17 
EU27  3.99 0.90 0.04 0.19 0.03 3.22    0.52  91.11 
CIS  17.59  12.70  0.03 1.64 0.18 2.87  30.20    34.79 
ROW  3.08 0.53 0.05 0.16 0.02 2.19  93.35  0.63   
Source: GTAP. 
 










key  EU27 CIS ROW 
Russia    22.60  13.21  10.24  12.89 4.40  3.81 19.57 3.76 
Ukraine 4.57    4.31 3.11 7.77 2.08 0.76 4.22 0.92 
Armenia 0.06 0.03    0.01 1.52 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Azerbai-
jan  0.17 0.03 0.00    4.55 0.12 0.09 0.85 0.04 
Georgia 0.09 0.07 6.54 0.44    0.16 0.01 0.41 0.01 
Turkey  1.72 1.77 2.27 5.68  12.91    3.17 3.46 1.99 
EU27  51.17 42.50 32.22 40.90 35.49 54.98    32.55 92.73 
CIS  3.21 8.25 0.41 5.10 2.66 0.72 0.44    0.52 
ROW  39.01 24.74 41.04 34.51 22.21 37.54 91.70 38.94   
Source: GTAP. 
 
5.5.2.  Deep FTAs 
 
Finally, we come to the main focus of our study i.e. the impact of greater insti-
tutional harmonization between the EU and the CIS5 as proxied by the reduction 
of border and standard costs and barriers to foreign provision of services. There 
are several reasons why we should expect the elimination of NTBs to be beneficial 
to the CIS5 and the EU. The reductions in barriers to trade and transport costs Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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decrease the prices of goods for consumers, as well as prices of intermediates and 
capital goods for producers. The extent of these gains depends on the amount of 
trade between the trading partners and the trade creation and trade diversion ef-
fects. Apart from increased efficiency of resource allocation, as demand shifts to 
regions with the lowest cost suppliers, additional gains stem from increased com-
petition. However all gains from trade also involve adjustment costs and may be 
associated with potentially painful restructuring in selected sectors and significant 
redistribution effects. The benefits of a Deep FTA for an individual country de-
pend on many factors such as the level of initial NTBs, trade intensity in sectors 
mostly affected by the reduction of NTBs, the economies of scale in the mostly 
affected sectors and other. 
Tables A6-A7 in the Annex 3 present the results of Deep FTAs. When analys-
ing the results of Simple or Deep FTAs it has to be borne in mind that the bench-
mark for all simulations is 2004, hence the results for Simple and Deep FTAs also 
include the impact of the initial trade liberalisation between 2004 and 2006. The 
effects of the 2006 liberalization will take several years to fully materialize. There-
fore to look, for example, at the additional welfare gains from a Deep FTA one 
needs to subtract the impact of the 2006 scenario. These net additional gains from 
a Deep FTA are presented in Table 14 below. Every column presents results for a 
given scenario e.g. the first one presents results for all countries of an EU-Armenia 
Deep FTA. In these FTA scenarios there are no changes assumed in EU relations 
with the remaining countries, hence in the first scenario the impact is the strongest 
on the integrating country - Armenia. Welfare is measured as a percentage change 
in equivalent variation as a share of GDP relative to it level in the benchmark 2006 
scenario. Implications of deep FTA for wages and trade flows are also presented in 




Table 14. Welfare, GDP, Wages and Trade Implications of Simple FTAs between 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine and the EU 
   Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia  Russia  Ukraine 
Welfare  (% change ) 
Russia 0.000  -0.003  -0.001  2.796  0.032 
Ukraine 0.009  -0.002  -0.003  0.169  5.830 
Armenia 3.130  0.008  0.012  0.041  0.004 
Azerbaijan 0.000 2.862 -0.003  0.200  0.008 
Georgia  0.108 -0.050 1.686  0.027  0.004 
Turkey -0.004  0.113  0.004  1.095  0.000 
EU27 0.001  0.023  -0.001  0.713  0.085 
CIS 0.001  0.019  0.001  0.617  0.224 
ROW   -0.001  0.014  -0.001  0.328  0.032 DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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   Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia  Russia  Ukraine 
Wages of skilled workers (% change) 
Russia  0.000 -0.001 0.000  2.505  0.008 
Ukraine 0.004  -0.002  -0.001  0.121  4.731 
Armenia 2.380  0.010  -0.003  0.076  0.013 
Azerbaijan 0.000 3.764 0.006  0.190  0.009 
Georgia  0.026 -0.046 1.469  0.099  0.018 
Turkey -0.002  0.069  0.002  0.753  0.005 
EU27 0.000  0.017  -0.001  0.532  0.065 
CIS 0.000  0.014  0.000  0.497  0.128 
ROW   0.000  0.009  0.000  0.224  0.022 
Wages of unskilled workers (% change) 
Russia  0.000 -0.005 0.000  3.060  -0.004 
Ukraine 0.009  -0.004  -0.001  0.098  6.385 
Armenia 3.661  0.007  0.027  -0.002  -0.009 
Azerbaijan 0.001 4.935 0.000  0.707  -0.007 
Georgia  0.123 -0.050 2.048  0.062  0.002 
Turkey -0.002  0.088  0.003  0.861  -0.003 
EU27 0.001  0.019  -0.001  0.578  0.070 
CIS 0.000  0.012  0.001  0.645  0.138 
ROW   -0.001  0.010  -0.001  0.232  0.021 
Total exports (% change) 
Russia  -0.003 -0.001 -0.001  19.594  0.077 
Ukraine 0.013  -0.018  -0.039  0.391  13.726 
Armenia 21.219  0.069  -0.148  1.154  0.167 
Azerbaijan -0.090 13.289 -0.516  1.914 0.007 
Georgia 0.560  -0.249  22.950  1.723  0.067 
Turkey -0.008  0.106  0.032  2.703  -0.020 
EU27 0.007  0.047  0.012  2.344  0.262 
CIS -0.002  0.031  0.000  1.779  0.357 
ROW   -0.003  0.022  0.007  1.214  0.045 
Total imports (% change) 
Russia  -0.004 -0.017 -0.005  17.445  0.027 
Ukraine 0.016  -0.032  -0.044  0.283  13.973 
Armenia 13.187  0.037  -0.163  0.438  0.042 
Azerbaijan  -0.039  2.199  -0.230 0.544 -0.035 
Georgia  0.262 -0.223 9.065  0.808  0.021 
Turkey -0.006  0.189  0.052  2.886  -0.035 
EU27 0.007  0.050  0.011  2.541  0.279 
CIS -0.002  0.024  -0.007  1.531  0.287 
ROW   -0.004  0.029  0.011  1.274  0.037 
 
Our estimates indicate that the major beneficiary of the institutional harmonisa-
tion would be Ukraine. Its estimated welfare gain could reach up to 5.8% in the 
long run. The welfare gains for the remaining countries are also sizeable i.e. Ar-Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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menia (3.1%), Russia (2.8%), Azerbaijan (1.8%) and Georgia (1.7%). Even though 
the estimated NTBs in Ukraine are not as high as in other CIS5 countries, the 
highest standard costs reductions are taking place in sectors where exports to the 
EU are particularly high e.g. 60–70% of the production of Textiles and textile 
products, Wood and wood products is being exported, out of which 70–80% to the 
EU. The impact on wages of skilled and unskilled workers in Ukraine is also the 
highest among the CIS5 contributing to sizeable welfare gains. In the CIS5 coun-
tries sectors using unskilled labour grow faster than sectors using skilled labour, as 
wages of unskilled workers increase at a faster pace. 
According to our simulations, the Deep FTA would also lead to a significant 
increase in total trade for all CIS5 countries. In the long run total exports of Geor-
gia, Armenia and Russia might go up by as much as about 20%, while total ex-
ports of Azerbaijan and Ukraine by about 13%. A negligible increase of trade 
would be also recorded in the EU27, apart from the EU-Russia Deep FTA where 
the EU imports and exports are expected to grow by about 2.5%. In all simulations 
the trade balance is held fixed hence an increase in total exports is accompanied by 
a compensating increase in total imports. 
When interpreting the output changes (Table A7 in the Annex 3) one has to 
keep in mind that the overall employment is held constant in simulations, hence 
decreases in production of some sectors are compensated by increases in produc-
tion in other sectors as skilled and unskilled workers shift between sectors. The 
changes in output are only indicative of the mechanisms at work and should not be 
treated as a forecast. Our results indicate significant structural changes in the CIS5 
economies. As a result of a Deep FTA some sectors would record significant in-
creases in total output, while other sectors would see their output decreasing dra-
matically. 
In Armenia the main sectors expected to increase their output following a Deep 
FTA include Leather products, Manufactures NEC (not elsewhere classified), 
Mineral Products and Textiles. This would be at the expense of Wood products, 
Transportation and Storage, Communications. In Azerbaijan the major beneficiar-
ies would include Textiles, Leather and Wood products. The contracting sectors 
are expected to include Mineral Products, Mining and quarrying, Paper products.  
In Georgia the expanding sectors include Textiles, Metals, Mining and quarrying. 
The contracting sectors include Leather products, Machinery and Electronic 
Equipment, Paper products. In Ukraine sectors gaining from a Deep FTA include 
Textiles and textiles products, Leather and Wood products. Generally most sectors 
see their output increasing, but the output of Manufactures NEC or Transportation 
and Storage would contract.  
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5.6.  Conclusions 
 
These simulations have presented a series of scenarios for EU-CIS free trade 
agreements. They begin with the effects of the 2006 unilateral free trade measures 
adopted by the CIS5 combined with the EU’s granting it GSP+ preferences to 
Georgia and GSP preferences to the remaining countries. In the case of Georgia 
these liberalizing measures were expected to have a significant impact on GDP 
growth, but they will take years to fully materialize. The Simple FTA scenario 
might not add much, since only the remaining agro-food tariffs would be disman-
tled. It is the Deep FTA scenario that adds significant benefits as a result of a more 
complete elimination of a comprehensive definition of barriers to trade and in-
vestment. A reduction of NTBs and improved access to the EU market would 
bring significant benefits to the CIS5 countries in terms of welfare gains, GDP 
growth, increases in real wages and expansion of international trade. The possible 
welfare implications of deep integration with the EU range from 5.8% of GDP in 
Ukraine to sizeable expected gains in Armenia (3.1%), Russia (2.8%), Azerbaijan 
(1.8%) and Georgia (1.7%). The structural changes in their economies are signifi-
cant with some sectors seeing their output decreasing significantly. However, 
these output, trade and GDP changes are expected to fully materialize over the 
period of 10–15 years and therefore the adjustment might be gradual and the tran-
sition less costly than indicated by total estimated changes in sectoral outputs. 
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6. Summary 
The aim of this study was to estimate the impact of the removal of NTBs in 
trade between the EU and its selected CIS partners: Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. We started with a review of methodologies and results of 
previous studies, concentrating on CEE and CIS regions. All methods can be di-
vided into three main groups: frequency-type methods, surveys and gravity model 
approach. Frequency-type estimates are more common, as they are easier to ob-
tain, at the same time there are very few surveys on NTBs in the CIS. The survey 
conducted in Ukraine showed that the costs of meeting EU technical standards are 
considered rather high and burdensome by local producers. Also, estimates of 
barriers to FDI in services sectors in Ukraine and Russia prove existence of sig-
nificant restrictions to trade and foreign investment in service sectors. 
This report further includes an overview of approaches to measurement of the 
effects from the improved market access (or NTB reduction), which include sur-
veys, macro-level econometric analysis, partial equilibrium models, and comput-
able general equilibrium (CGE) models. The reviewed studies report that internal 
market access and lessening of NTBs may lead to considerable aggregate trade 
increase for CEES countries as a result of their integration with EU market. The 
studies on CIS countries are scarce. A few available studies concentrate predomi-
nantly on the effects of WTO accession and deal with a limited range of countries.  
For the estimation of the trade-related harmonisation effects we employed a 
computable general equilibrium model. The model encompassed the following 
three pillars of trade facilitation: legislative and regulatory approximation (reduc-
tion of standard costs), reform of customs rules and procedures (resulting in reduc-
tion of border costs), and liberalization of the access of foreign providers of ser-
vices. In our assumptions on reduction these costs we relied upon the results of a 
survey of the non-tariff barriers and on barriers to foreign direct investment in 
services made for Ukraine and then made extrapolation to other countries based on 
the review of the respective barriers in these countries.  
We conclude that an institutional harmonisation with the EU modelled here as 
a reduction of NTBs and improved access to the EU market would bring signifi-
cant benefits to the CIS5 countries in terms of welfare gains, GDP growth, in-
creases in real wages and expansion of international trade. The possible welfare 
implications of deep integration with the EU range from 5.8% of GDP in Ukraine DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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to sizeable expected gains in Armenia (3.1%), Russia (2.8%), Azerbaijan (1.8%) 
and Georgia (1.7%). The structural changes in their economies are significant with 
some sectors seeing their output decreasing significantly. However, these output, 
trade and GDP changes are expected to fully materialize over the period of 10–15 
years and therefore the adjustment might be gradual and the transition less costly 
than indicated by total estimated changes in sectoral outputs. 
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Table A1 Non-Tariff Measures Applied in Ukraine (used by Veronika Movchan, 
Institute of Economic research and Policy Consulting, Kyiv, to form the NTBs data-
base) 
•  Compulsory certification of conformity to standards 
•  Licensing of selected export and import activities 
•  Minimum value requirement (in effect from 1996-2000) 
•  Preliminary customs declaration 
•  Ecological control 
•  Sanitary control 
•  Phytosanitary control 
•  Veterinary control 
•  Permits for medicine imports 
•  State procurement regulations with regard to imports 
•  Customs value calculation inquiry (checking declared value for the purpose of tax and 
tariff calculations, in 
•  effect from 1996-2000) 
•  Customs controls 
•  Verification of contract price and origin for selected commodities 
•  Control over selected types of technology and equipment, such as energy-saving 
equipment, meteorological 
•  equipment, nuclear materials, weapons materials, materials that could be used to pro-
duce chemical and 
•  bacteriological weapons, and equipment for clandestine information gathering. 
 


















1 i  
where INBj is an index of non-tariff barriers for commodity group j, NBij is an 
indicator of application of non-tariff barrier i to commodity group j, IMj is the 
value of commodity group j; i=1,…,I, j=1,…J, where I is a number of non-tariff DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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barriers incorporated in the study, and J is the total number of groups of commodi-















ij NB  
where zero means absence of the non-tariff barrier i for commodity j, and 100 is a 
maximum value of severity of non-tariff barrier i for commodity j. 
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This model is based on the MRT – Multiregional Trade Model – by Harrison, 





Markets and prices 
 
The following notational conventions are adopted: 
i, j – indexes of goods 
r, s – indexes of regions 
f – primary factors 
p – market price index, 1 in the benchmark 
x - benchmark value of quantity variable X.  
 
 
The following market prices are included in the model: 
 
PCr  – price index for final consumption in region r 
PGr  - price index for government provision in region r 
PAir   – price index for the Armington aggregate of good i in region r, inclusive 
of all applicable tariffs, border costs and monopolistic markups 
PYir - supply price (marginal cost) of good i from region r, excluding fixed 
costs associated with the production of goods in industries subject to IRTS 
                                                 
42 Their code was obtained from Anders Hoffmann with the permission of Thomas Ruther-
ford and our modelling exercise uses large parts of this code. This model in turn is based 
on the code employed in their evaluation of the Uruguay Round in HRT (1995, 1996a), 
which is available for public access on Harrison’s Web site. DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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PFir - price index for factor inputs in sector i, region r 
PT  - price index for transport services. 
 
 
Summary of the equilibrium relationships 
 
Final demand in each region arises from a representative agent, maximising a 
Cobb-Douglas utility function subject to a budget constraint. Income is composed 
of returns to primary factors and tax revenue directed to the consumer as a lump 
sum. 
Within each region, final and intermediate demands are composed of the same 
Armington aggregate of domestic and imported varieties. The composite supply is 
a nested CES function, where consumers first allocate their expenditures among 
domestic and imported varieties and in the second level the consumers choose 
among imported varieties. In the imperfect competition case firm varieties enter at 
the bottom of the CES function.  
There is no distinction between goods produced for domestic market and for 
exports. Goods are produced with the use of intermediate inputs and primary fac-
tors. Primary factors are mobile across sectors, but not across regions. We assume 
a CES function over primary factors and a Leontief production function for inter-
mediate inputs and factors of production composite. Exports are not differentiated 
by the country of destination. 
All distortions are represented as ad valorem price-wedges. They consists of 
factor and intermediate input taxes in production, output tax, import tariffs, export 








(1)  ∑ =
s
irs ir X Y  
where Yir is output of good i in region r, Xirs is export of good i from region r to s 
and if r=s,  Xirs represents domestic sales. Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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Regional demand 
(2)  ∑ + + =
j
ir jr ijr ir ir T Y a C A  
where Air is total supply (production plus imports), Cir is total final consumption, 




(3)  ir ir ir
V
ir ir N f Y a V + =  
where Vir is total sector i value added, a
V
ir is value added demand coefficient, fir is 
the fixed cost per firm and Nir is the number of firms in IRTS sectors.  
 
Primary factor markets 




fir fr V a F  
where  fr F is the endowment of factor f in region r and a
F
fir is the price-responsive 
























































α = ∑  
where  ir A  is the benchmark supply, 
D
ir α is the value share of domestic supply, 
irs X is benchmark exports of good i from region r to s, 
M
irs θ is the benchmark value 
share of region r exports in region s imports and ρDM and ρM are determined by 
Armington elasticities of substitution σDM and σM: 
1 − σ
σ
= ρ . 
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where  ir V  is benchmark value-added, 
F
fir α  is the benchmark value share of factor 
f, 
F
fir a  is the benchmark input coefficient and ρ
F























where τ is the index of single commodity used for transport services and βjrs is the 
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where  1 A P ir =  
 







s irs is irs irs
M
irs ir ) PT PY )( t ˆ 1 )( 1 ( PM









β + + μ + θ = ∑  
and  
(14)  r i ir PA PT
τ =   
where  irs μ  is the mark-up on marginal cost on sales of good i from a firm in re-
gion r in region s,  irs t ˆ is the ad valorem tax rate which incorporates import tariffs 
and export subsidies,  ir D P is the benchmark supply price for goods from domestic 
producers,  ir M P is the benchmark supply price for imports.  
 
Regional income  
Regional income is a sum of factor income, indirect taxes, taxes on intermedi-
ate demand, factor tax revenue, public tax revenue, consumption tax revenue, ex-
port tax revenue and tariff revenue net of investment demand, public sector de-
mand and net capital outflows: 
(15) 
YI D F
r fr fr ir ir ir ijr ir jr ijr fir fr fir
fi i j f i
M = PF F + t PY Y + t PY Y a + t PF V + ∑∑ ∑ ∑  
GC X MX T
ir ir ir ir if ir irs ir irs irs is isr isr isr
ii i si s
DG C
ir ir ir ir ir n r
ii
t PG G + t PC C + t PY X + t (PY X (1+t )+p T )-












ir G G  
 
A representative agent determines demand in each region. He is endowed with 
primary factors, tax revenue and exogenous capital flows from other regions. He 
allocates his income to investment (exogenous), public demand (held constant in DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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real terms) and private demand. Private demand is determined by the maximisa-
tion of Cobb-Douglas utility function: 
(17) 
C
ri r i r
i
U= θ log(C ) ∑   
Aggregate final demand is then determined by regional expenditures and the 
unit price of aggregate commodities gross of tax: 
(18) 














where Er is regional expenditure, which equals income (Mr) net of investment and 
public expenditures. 
 
Bilateral trade flows 
There are two tax margins (import and export tax) and transport costs in the 
model. Transport costs are proportional to trade. Transport costs are defined by a 







T= ψ TD ∑ ∏  
Bilateral trade flows are determined by cost-minimising choice given the fob 
export price of commodity from region r (PYir), the export tax rate (tir
X), and the 
import tariff rate (tir
M), where the export tax applies on the fob price net of trans-
port margins, while the import tariff applies on a cif price. 
 





ir r irs ir irs irs
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X ) PT PY )( t ˆ 1 (
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•  Goods are distinguished by firm, by region and area of origin (domestic 
or imported).  
•  Demands arise from a nested CES function with a supply from firms in a 
single region at the lowest level of the CES aggregate. At the next level, Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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the firms compete with supplies from other regions from the same area 
and at the top level consumers choose between goods from different ar-
eas. Demand for final composite arises from a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function. 
•  Producers compete in quantities based on a Cournot model with fixed 
conjectural variations. Markups over marginal costs are based on the 
profit maximisation. There is free entry, so profits in equilibrium are 
zero. Markup covers the fixed costs, which are fixed at the firm level and 
as the markup revenue in a region changes, so does the number of firms. 
•  The model does not incorporate gains from variety, only the rationalisa-
tion gains. A reduction in tariffs leads to loss of the market share by do-
mestic firms. Domestic producers reduce the markup on marginal costs, 
some domestic firms exit, the remaining firms slide down their average 





The equilibrium conditions for each market where there are IRTS are estimated 
separately. The following notation is adopted: 
 
X – Aggregate demand 
Yk – Supply from are k 
Sr – Supply from region r 
qfr – Supply from firm f in region r 
P – Price index for aggregate demand 
Pk – Price index for supply from area k 
wr – Price index for supply from region r 
πfr – Sales price for supply from firm f in region r. 
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The associated price indices: 
(24) 
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Behaviour of firms 
 
The profit of firm f in region r selling into a given market is as follows: 
(30)  ) q ( C q ) q ( fr fr fr − π = Π  
where C is total cost. First order conditions for profit maximisation may be written 
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(31)  ) m 1 ( c fr fr fr − π =  
in which cfr is the marginal cost of supply and mfr is a markup over marginal cost 












− = − =  
where efr is the perceived elasticity of demand. The expression for the elasticity of 
demand arises from the nested CES structure of demand and depends on the as-
sumed reaction of other producers. 
 
 
The perceived elasticity of demand 
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Here, HRT develop further derivations with the simplifying assumption of uni-
tary conjectural variations (Cournot conjectures). The non-unitary conjectures are 
introduced to reconcile the estimates of the economies of scale in production with 
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Applying the same operations again at the highest level of the CES, given that 





Y p 1 1
p Y










When equations (39)-(41) are assembled, we obtain an expression for the opti-
























































= θ   for k = kr 
and the supply from area k in total supply of a given good is denoted as: 
(44) 
PX
Y p k k X
k = θ  
In our model we assumed that products of different firms are imperfect substi-
tutes in demand. The elasticity of demand depends on the country of origin. There 
are three elasticities of substitution associated with the nested CES structure of 
demand discussed earlier: Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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•  σDD – elasticity of substitution between varieties supplied by domestic 
firms  
•  σMM – elasticity of substitution between products of any two foreign sup-
pliers  
•  σDM – elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported varieties. 
We assume that domestically produced goods are more easily substitutable 
among themselves than products from different countries and that σDD is 15. In 
addition imported goods are assumed to be better substitutes to each other than 
domestic and foreign goods. The elasticity of substitution between imported goods 
is assumed to be equal 10, while domestic and foreign goods enter the demand 
function with the elasticity of substitution of 5. These are priors used by HRT 
(1994). 
Further let θrs denote the market share of region r firms in region s. Then we 
can apply equation (42) to represent the optimal markup applied in the domestic 
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These are the optimal markups expressed as a function of elasticities of substi-
tution, market shares, θ
M
r the market share of imports in region r and Nr the num-
ber of firms producing in the region r.  
 
 
Estimation of the equilibrium conditions in ITRS sectors 
 
This paper adopts a simplification by estimating the equilibrium conditions in 
IRTS industries for each commodity in separate models. Demands and supplies for 
all regions are included into these calculations, but factor markets, intersectoral 
linkages and income effects are ignored. In each iteration of the IRTS models, 
regional demand functions are calibrated to the most recently estimated equilib-
rium conditions of the general model including all GE interactions. Given constant 
marginal cost, sales prices are determined by the markup equations.   
The single commodity models are estimated as follows. The markup pricing 
equation (44) is specified given the benchmark elasticities of substitution, the 
number of firms and an adjustment parameter, the conjectural variation. First, the DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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values of elasticities of substitution at all nests of the CES function, as well as the 
number of firms and therefore their market shares are specified. Further, the value 
of production at consumer prices at the benchmark combined with the estimates of 
the cost disadvantage ratio taken from the literature (see next section), determine 
the value of fixed costs, i.e. FCir = CDRirYCir. Given the assumption of zero prof-
its, the markup over marginal cost generates the revenue equal exactly to the fixed 
costs. This condition appears as a constraint in a non-linear least squares calcula-
tion.  
The objective in the estimation is to calibrate the conjectural variations, which 
are as close as possible to one. This value is consistent with pure Cournot-Nash 
behaviour of players. Therefore a sequence of least-squares problems is solved for 
each commodity subject to IRTS. These problems look for implicit numbers of 
firms (Nr) which results in calibrated conjectural variations (CVrs) which are as 
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θ σ = ∑
 
where M
G is a markup equation, i.e. equation (45), and X
i
rs represents sales of i 
from region r in region s.  
Therefore, the conjectural variations act as parameters, which allow reconcilia-
tion of the benchmark data with the estimates of the elasticities of substitution and 
CDR taken from the literature. In the majority of sectors calibrated conjectural 
variations are less than 1 indicating a more competitive behaviour than predicted 
by the Cournot model.  
For sectors, where the assumption of free entry and zero profits in the bench-
mark, given values of the elasticity of substitution, is consistent with pure Cour-
not-Nash type behaviour, a second calculation is performed. It looks for the num-
ber of firms as small as possible subject to the consistency of conjectures with the 
Cournot behaviour.  
(48) 
r ir min N  
subject to: Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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(49) 
iG i












Calibrating the Cost Disadvantage Ratio 
 
The calibration of the cost disadvantage ratio (CDR) in IRTS sectors is based 
on the assumption of constant marginal cost. The total cost function is specified as 
follows: 
(50)  c=f+mq  
where f is fixed cost, m is constant marginal cost and q denotes the output level. 




ac + =  
Assuming zero profits, the benchmark data provides the information on the in-
dustry total costs (C) and output (Q).  If there are n representative firms in the 
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+ =  
Given the assumption about a specific form of the average cost curve, we only 
need a second point in order to calibrate it. This is done with the use of informa-
tion from the engineering estimates on changes in average cost accompanying 












where 0<α<1, β>1 is required for the marginal cost to be nonnegative. Given the 
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By multiplying the nominators and denominators of the last two equations we 
obtain equations on the total output and costs of industry, on which the data is 
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Since the cost disadvantage ratio is defined as f/c, which by symmetry equals 








We obtain the values of α and β from Pratten (1988). Since there are no esti-
mates of the economies of scale for all 3-digit sectors according to NACE classifi-
cation or the available estimates are not representative, we used a rage of esti-
mated parameters for each GTAP sector. Based on those parameters we con-
structed three values of the CDRs i.e. low and high using the lowest and highest 
values of the estimated parameters and middle one. The only exception was the 
food sector, where the economies of scale differ a lot by products, so we used the 
average production values to aggregate the CDRs for more finely defined sectors.  
Following others such as Gasiorek, Smith and Venables (1992) or HRT (1994), 
I am assuming that in the benchmark equilibrium firms operate at the minimum 
efficient scale (MES). Firms should have difficulties competing, if they were oper-
ating at less than MES. Given the function form used in this study, at the MES 
further expansion of output reduces average cost of production. If initially output 
is lower than the MES, then the CDRs will be underestimated since the slope of 
the average cost curve increases in absolute value for decreases in output. In all 
scenarios we assume low values for the economies of scale.  
 
 Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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dium  High 
Source of 
Data 
Agriculture  0.00  0  0.0 0.0 0.0   
Raw  materials  0.00  0  0.0 0.0 0.0   
Food, Beverages, 
Tobacco     7.7  11.1  14.5   
   Meat  0.67  5        412 
   Dairy  0.67  2        413 
   Other food  0.67  4 to 9        414, 416, 
420, 422 
   Tobacco  0.33  2.2 to 5        429 
Textiles  0.50  2 to 10  2.0  6.0  10.0  43 
Clothing  0.00  0  0.0 0.0 0.0   
Leather  0.33  1.5  0.7 0.7 0.7  451 
Wood  0.00  0  0.0 0.0 0.0   
Paper  0.50  8 to 13  8.0  10.5  13.0  471, 472 
Petroleum  0.33  4  2.0 2.0 2.0  14 
Chemicals  0.33  4 to 19  2.0  5.7  9.4  25 
Non-metallic 
Minerals  0.33 10  to  26  4.9  8.9  12.8  241-247 
Iron, steel  0.33  10 to 11  4.9  5.2  5.4  22 
Other metals  0.33  11 to 11  4.9  5.2  5.4  224 
Metal  prod.  0.33  10  4.9 4.9 4.9  221 
Motor  vehicles  0.50  11  11.0 11.0 11.0  35 
Other transport  0.50  8 to 20  8.0  14.0  20.0  361 
Electronics  0.33  5 to 15  2.5  4.9  7.4  23, 344, 345 
Machinery n.e.c.  0.50  3 to 10  3.0  6.5  10.0  321, 322, 
326 
Manufacturing 
n.e.c.  0.50  3 to 5  3.0  4.0  5.0  HRT 
Utilities    0.00  0  0.0 0.0 0.0   
Trade  0.00  0  0.0 0.0 0.0   
Transport  0.50  2  2.0 2.0 2.0  HRT 
Financial  services  0.50  5  5.0 5.0 5.0  HRT 
Notes: 
Column 1: Parameter α in the CDR calibration equation. 
Column 2: Data corresponds to (β-1)*100 where β is from the CDR calibration equation. 
Column 3-5: CDR estimated according to equation 58. 
Column 6: Numbers indicated in this column correspond to NACE sectors from Table 5.1 
in Pratten (1988). The assumptions on CDRs in services follow assumptions of HRT 
(1994).  
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Table A3. Welfare, GDP, Wages and Trade Implications of the changes in tariffs and 
border costs (in Georgia and Armenia) between 2004 and 2006-2007 
   Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Russia Ukraine  ALL 
Welfare  (% change ) 
Russia 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.40  0.00  0.40 
Ukraine 0.00  -0.01  -0.02  0.28  0.03  0.29 
Armenia 0.36 0.00 -0.02  0.16  -0.01  0.29 
Azerbaijan -0.01  0.11  -0.11 0.19  -0.01  0.09 
Georgia 0.03  -0.02  0.93  0.15  -0.04  0.78 
Turkey 0.00  0.00  0.03  0.67  0.01  0.71 
EU27 0.00  0.00  0.01  0.51  0.02  0.54 
CIS 0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.29  -0.01  0.28 
ROW   0.00  0.00  0.01  0.43  0.01  0.45 
GDP (% change) 
Russia 0.05  0.05  0.05  0.46  0.05  0.45 
Ukraine -0.26  -0.28  -0.29  0.01  -0.24  0.02 
Armenia 0.38 0.03 0.00  0.18  0.00  0.33 
Azerbaijan 0.01  0.13  -0.09  0.21  0.01  0.11 
Georgia 0.11 0.07  1.03  0.22  0.04  0.87 
Turkey 0.09  0.09  0.12  0.76  0.10  0.80 
EU27 0.03  0.03  0.04  0.54  0.05  0.57 
CIS 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.29  -0.01  0.28 
ROW   0.01  0.02  0.02  0.44  0.03  0.46 
Wages of unskilled workers (% change) 
Russia 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.48  0.00  0.48 
Ukraine 0.00  -0.01  -0.02  0.15  0.13  0.27 
Armenia 0.42 0.00 -0.04  0.15  -0.03  0.29 
Azerbaijan -0.02  0.00  -0.11 0.09  -0.03  -0.02 
Georgia 0.03  -0.03  2.78  0.18  -0.04  2.60 
Turkey 0.00  0.00  0.02  0.50  0.00  0.53 
EU27 0.00  0.00  0.01  0.39  0.01  0.41 
CIS 0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.20  -0.02  0.18 
ROW   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.31  0.01  0.33 
Wages of skilled workers (% change) 
Russia 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.50  0.00  0.50 
Ukraine 0.00  -0.01  -0.02  0.22  0.24  0.45 
Armenia 0.34 0.00 -0.01  0.19  -0.01  0.39 Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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   Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Russia Ukraine  ALL 
Azerbaijan -0.02  0.23  -0.10 0.14  -0.02  0.06 
Georgia 0.02  -0.02  2.33  0.17  -0.02  2.26 
Turkey  0.00  0.00  0.02 0.48 0.01 0.50 
EU27  0.00  0.00  0.01 0.37 0.01 0.39 
CIS  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.25 0.00 0.25 
ROW    0.00  0.00  0.00 0.29 0.01 0.30 
 
Table A4. Welfare, GDP, Wages and Trade Implications of Simple FTAs between 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine and the EU 
   Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia  Russia  Ukraine 
Welfare  (% change ) 
Russia 0.00  -0.01  0.00  1.59  -0.02 
Ukraine 0.00  -0.03  -0.02  0.56  1.76 
Armenia 0.51  0.01  -0.02  0.52  0.00 
Azerbaijan -0.01  0.85  -0.11 1.07  0.01 
Georgia 0.02  -0.06  1.03  0.52  -0.02 
Turkey 0.00  -0.01  0.03  -0.01  0.02 
EU27  0.00 0.02 0.01  0.06  0.09 
CIS  0.00 0.00 0.00  1.04  0.03 
ROW    0.00 0.01 0.01  0.03  0.05 
GDP (% change) 
Russia  0.05 0.05 0.05  1.65  0.04 
Ukraine -0.27  -0.30  -0.29  0.29  1.49 
Armenia  0.53 0.03 0.00  0.55  0.03 
Azerbaijan 0.01  0.87  -0.09 1.09 0.03 
Georgia  0.11 0.02 1.12  0.60  0.07 
Turkey  0.09 0.08 0.12  0.08  0.11 
EU27  0.03 0.05 0.04  0.09  0.12 
CIS  0.00 0.00 0.00  1.04  0.03 
ROW    0.01 0.02 0.02  0.04  0.06 
Wages of unskilled workers (% change) 
Russia 0.00  -0.01  0.00  2.08  -0.03 
Ukraine 0.00  -0.04  -0.03  0.21  2.71 
Armenia 0.83  0.01  -0.04  0.51  -0.02 
Azerbaijan -0.02  1.83  -0.11 0.81 -0.02 
Georgia 0.02  -0.07  2.95  0.63  -0.03 
Turkey 0.00  -0.01  0.02  -0.01  0.01 
EU27  0.00 0.01 0.01  0.04  0.07 
CIS  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.73  0.01 
ROW    0.00 0.01 0.00  -0.01  0.03 
Wages of skilled workers (% change) 
Russia  0.00 0.00 0.00  2.00  -0.02 
Ukraine 0.00  -0.02  -0.02  0.37  2.14 
Armenia 0.72  0.01  -0.01  0.57  0.01 
Azerbaijan -0.02  2.12  -0.10 0.88  0.00 DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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   Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia  Russia  Ukraine 
Georgia  0.02 -0.05 2.50 0.58 0.00 
Turkey  0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
EU27  0.00 0.01 0.01  0.03  0.06 
CIS  0.00 0.01 0.00  0.81  0.03 
ROW    0.00 0.01 0.00  0.00  0.03 
Total exports (% change) 
Russia 0.00  -0.02  0.00  11.70  -0.08 
Ukraine 0.00  -0.05  -0.03  0.16  5.84 
Armenia  6.12 0.04 0.00  2.59  0.08 
Azerbaijan -0.09  4.33  -0.50 4.71  0.06 
Georgia 0.12  -0.12  16.20  2.68  0.02 
Turkey  0.00 -0.01 0.03 1.27 0.04 
EU27  0.00 0.03 0.01  1.59  0.21 
CIS  0.00 0.01 0.00  1.63  0.06 
ROW    0.00 0.01 0.01  1.02  0.05 
Total imports (% change) 
Russia 0.00  -0.03  -0.01  7.55  -0.11 
Ukraine 0.00  -0.06  -0.04  0.02  4.79 
Armenia 3.14  0.02  -0.06  1.23  0.03 
Azerbaijan -0.04  -0.68  -0.23 1.59  0.00 
Georgia  0.04 -0.16 4.04 1.25 0.02 
Turkey  0.00 -0.03 0.05 1.06 0.00 
EU27  0.00 0.04 0.01  2.00  0.21 
CIS  0.00 0.01 0.00  1.21  0.04 
ROW    0.00 0.02 0.01  1.01  0.07 
 
Table A5. Percentage change in total output by sectors as a result of Simple FTAs 
   Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia  Russia  Ukraine 
Grains, fruits, vegeta-
bles, crops nec  0.2 -1.7 0.3 0.4 1.3 
Livestock -0.2  -2.8  -0.1  0.9  2.2 
Forestry -1.0  -0.8  -2.7  -0.6  -1.8 
Fishing 10.2  -0.8    1.0  1.1 
Coal     3.6  2.6  0.3 
Oil   1.1  9.5  4.4  0.2 
Gas   1.0  5.5  2.4   
Mining and quarrying  0.9  -9.1  14  3.8  -1.2 
Food products, bever-
ages and tobacco  -1.9 -3.4 -6.3 0.2 1.1 
Textiles and textile 
goods  59.6 28.2 2.9 -3.7 84.0 
Leather products  4.9  23.8  -21.2  -5.0  32.7 
Wood products  -7.4  -45.7  4.1  -9.5  0.7 
Paper products, publish-
ing  0.2 -11.9  -20.8  -5.1 -1.6 Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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   Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia  Russia  Ukraine 
Petroleum, coal products  0.5  1.0  -2.0  2.6  0.4 
Chemical, rubber, plastic 
products  -0.3 -0.6 2.6 0.1 -1.7 
Mineral products nec  0.7  -7.7  -8.1  -5.1  -5.4 
Metals and metal prod-
ucts  5.0 19.1  21.2  4.3 -0.3 
Transport equipment  -2.2  10.5  -4.7  -1.2  2.6 
Machinery and electronic 
equipment  2.4 5.1  -16.3  -6.4  1.6 
Manufactures nec  4.3  -6.1  -20.2  -5.1  -7.1 
Electricity 0.2  0.8  -0.2  0.8  0.9 
Gas manufacture, distri-
bution  0.6 0.7 3.7  1.6 0.4 
Water 0.7  0.8  0.3  1.4  0.4 
Construction 0.5  3.2  2.2  2.3  2.6 
Trade 0.4  1.6  -0.4  1.5  1.2 
Transportation and Stor-
age Services  0.6 2.1 9.4  2.9 1.2 
Communications -0.3  0.4  -0.8  1.2  0.7 
Banking lending and 
insurance  -0.5 4.0 -0.6  1.2 0.6 
Business services nec  0.8  0.9  -0.3  2.3  0.6 
Other Communal, Social 
and Personal Services  0.1 1.0 0.8  1.5   
Public administration, 
education, health care  0.1 0.3  -0.2  1.0 0.1 
Investments 0.4  0.9  2.2  2.0  2.6 
 
Table A6. Welfare, GDP, Wages and Trade Implications of Deep FTAs between Ar-
menia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine and the EU 
   Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia  Russia  Ukraine  ENP5 
Welfare (% change ) 
Russia  0.00 -0.01 0.00 3.20 0.03 0.48 
Ukraine  0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.45 5.86 2.63 
Armenia  3.49  0.01  -0.01 0.20 -0.01 0.23 
Azerbaijan  -0.01 2.98 -0.12  0.39 0.00 3.21 
Georgia  0.13 -0.07 2.62 0.17  -0.03  1.18 
Turkey  0.00  0.11  0.03 1.76 0.01 0.18 
EU27  0.00  0.03  0.01 1.22 0.10 0.07 
CIS  0.00  0.01  0.00 0.91 0.22 0.65 
ROW    0.00  0.02  0.00 0.76 0.05 0.05 
GDP (% change) 
Russia  0.05  0.05  0.05 3.25 0.08 0.53 
Ukraine  -0.25 -0.28 -0.29 0.18 5.58 2.36 
Armenia 3.50  0.03  0.03 0.23 0.03 0.25 DEEP INTEGRATION WITH THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON ENP COUNTRIES… 
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   Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia  Russia  Ukraine  ENP5 
Azerbaijan  0.01  3.00 -0.10 0.41 0.02 3.23 
Georgia  0.22  0.02  2.70 0.27 0.07 1.27 
Turkey  0.09  0.20  0.12 1.86 0.10 0.27 
EU27  0.03  0.06  0.04 1.26 0.13 0.10 
CIS  0.00  0.02  0.00 0.91 0.22 0.65 
ROW    0.01  0.03  0.02 0.77 0.06 0.06 
Wages of unskilled workers (% change) 
Russia  0.00 -0.01 0.00 3.54  -0.01  0.32 
Ukraine  0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.25 6.51 2.30 
Armenia  4.08  0.01  -0.01 0.15 -0.03 0.21 
Azerbaijan  -0.02 4.94 -0.11  0.80  -0.04  5.01 
Georgia  0.15 -0.08 4.83 0.24  -0.04  1.13 
Turkey  0.00  0.09  0.02 1.36 0.00 0.15 
EU27  0.00  0.02  0.00 0.97 0.08 0.06 
CIS  0.00  0.01  0.00 0.85 0.12 0.64 
ROW    0.00  0.01  0.00 0.55 0.03 0.03 
Wages of skilled workers (% change) 
Russia  0.00  0.00  0.00 3.00 0.01 0.41 
Ukraine  0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.34 4.97 1.95 
Armenia 2.72  0.01 -0.01 0.27 0.01 0.23 
Azerbaijan  -0.02 3.99 -0.10  0.33  -0.01  4.92 
Georgia  0.05 -0.06 3.80 0.26 0.00 1.25 
Turkey  0.00  0.07  0.02 1.23 0.01 0.13 
EU27  0.00  0.02  0.00 0.91 0.08 0.05 
CIS  0.00  0.01  0.00 0.74 0.13 0.49 
ROW    0.00  0.01  0.00 0.51 0.03 0.03 
Total exports (% change) 
Russia 0.00  0.00  0.00  19.59  0.08  2.17 
Ukraine 0.01  -0.02  -0.04  0.39  13.73  4.29 
Armenia 21.22 0.07 -0.15 1.15 0.17 0.89 
Azerbaijan -0.09  13.29  -0.52  1.91  0.01  15.34 
Georgia  0.56 -0.25 22.95  1.72 0.07 5.97 
Turkey -0.01  0.11  0.03  2.70  -0.02  0.15 
EU27  0.01  0.05  0.01 2.34 0.26 1.41 
CIS  0.00  0.03  0.00 1.78 0.36 0.10 
ROW    0.00  0.02  0.01 1.21 0.05 0.00 
Total imports (% change) 
Russia 0.00  -0.02  -0.01  17.45  0.03  2.48 
Ukraine 0.02  -0.03  -0.04  0.28  13.97  4.80 
Armenia 13.19 0.04 -0.16 0.44 0.04 0.43 
Azerbaijan  -0.04 2.20 -0.23  0.54  -0.04  1.56 
Georgia  0.26 -0.22 9.07 0.81 0.02 3.79 
Turkey -0.01  0.19  0.05  2.89  -0.04  0.29 
EU27  0.01  0.05  0.01 2.54 0.28 0.14 
CIS  0.00  0.02 -0.01 1.53 0.29 1.45 
ROW    0.00  0.03  0.01 1.27 0.04 0.10 Maryla Maliszewska, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
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Table A7. Percentage change in total output by sectors as a result of Deep FTAs 
 Armenia Azerbai-
jan  Georgia Russia Ukraine 
Grains, fruits, vegetables, 
crops nec  3.6 3.7 4.5 -1.8 6.5 
Livestock  3.0 -5.1 1.6 2.7 7.4 
Forestry -0.7  3.6  -3.0  13.4  2.4 
Fishing  18.7  -0.9 1.1 2.1 5.2 
Coal      0.9 9.9 5.2 
Oil    7.7 6.2 4.6 3.1 
Gas   3.9  5.0  2.9  -1.0 
Mining and quarrying  -3.1  -16.9  19.3  8.5  2.1 
Food products, beverages and 
tobacco  -1.6 -6 -6.8  2.0 7.1 
Textiles and textile goods  9.3  71.8  58.3  8.7  53.6 
Leather products  35.4  28.2  -20.7  -4.2  47.1 
Wood  products  -4.7 18.6 15.9 44.3 23.9 
Paper products, publishing  0.1  -15.4  -23  3.3  3.5 
Petroleum, coal products  -3.3  17.7  -4.3  7.3  6.8 
Chemical, rubber, plastic 
products  -2.4 4.1 14.2 3.9 4.9 
Mineral products nec  31.3  -19.3  -7.0  -6.2  1.8 
Metals and metal products  18.8  23.2  42.5  10  8.5 
Transport equipment  -0.5  5.9  -6.1  -0.3  6.5 
Machinery and electronic 
equipment  5.2 17.1  -18.1  -5.7   
Manufactures nec  40.5  34.7  -10.1  -0.9  -4.6 
Electricity  1.0 3.1 0.7 4.7 6.0 
Gas manufacture, distribution  0.4  2.4  -0.3  3.7  2.6 
Water 5.3  2.7  1.9  2  2.7 
Construction  3.7 6.2 3.8 3.6 6.6 
Trade  3.1 3.2 1.6 3.6 4.3 
Transportation and Storage 
Services  -7.4  5.7  -1.3  -5.1 
Communications -3.7  0.4  -3.0    2.0 
Banking lending and insurance 10.7  -10.8  -1.2  -11.7  -1.6 
Business services nec  4.3  1.0  1.2  2  1.1 
Other Communal, Social and 
Personal Services  -2.7 2.2 1.9 2.2 -0.4 
Public administration, educa-
tion, health care  1.2 1.3 0.4 2.1 1.1 
Investments  3.7 3.1 3.8 3.6 7.1 
 